Texas A&M University School of Law

Texas A&M Law Scholarship
Faculty Scholarship
11-2016

License Plate Reader Technology: Transportation Uses and
Privacy Risks
Johanna Zmud
Jason Wagner
Maarit Moran
James P. George
Texas A&M University School of Law, pgeorge@law.tamu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar
Part of the Transportation Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Johanna Zmud, Jason Wagner, Maarit Moran & James P. George, License Plate Reader Technology:
Transportation Uses and Privacy Risks, (2016).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/923

This Report is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more
information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.

NCHRP 08-36, Task 136
License Plate Reader Technology: Transportation
Uses and Privacy Risks

Johanna Zmud
Jason Wagner
Maarit Moran
Texas A&M Transportation Institute
James P. George, Texas A&M School of Law
The Texas A&M University System
College Station, Texas
November 2016

The information contained in this report was prepared as part of NCHRP Project 08-36,
Task 136, National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP).
Special Note: This report IS NOT an official publication of the NCHRP, the Transportation Research Board
or the National Academies.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This study was conducted for the AASHTO Standing Committee on Planning, with
funding provided through the National Cooperative Highway Research Program
(NCHRP) Project 08-36, Research for the AASHTO Standing Committee on Planning.
The NCHRP is supported by annual voluntary contributions from the state
Departments of Transportation. Project 08-36 is intended to fund quick response
studies on behalf of the Standing Committee on Planning. The report was prepared by
Johanna Zmud, Jason Wagner, Maarit Moran, and James P. George. The project was
managed by Lawrence D. Goldstein, NCHRP Senior Program Officer.

DISCLAIMER

The opinions and conclusions expressed or implied are those of the research agency
that performed the research and are not necessarily those of the Transportation
Research Board or its sponsoring agencies. This report has not been reviewed or
accepted by the Transportation Research Board Executive Committee or the Governing
Board of the National Research Council.

4

CONTENTS
List of Figures and Tables ............................................................................................................. vii
List of Acronyms ...........................................................................................................................viii
Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................................... ix
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... 10
Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................... 11
Chapter 1. Background ................................................................................................................. 13
Research Objectives and Scope ................................................................................................... 13
LPR Technology ....................................................................................................................... 14
Data Privacy Concerns .............................................................................................................. 16
Report Organization ..................................................................................................................... 17
Chapter 2. Major Transportation Uses and Privacy Risk Taxonomy ..................................... 18
Travel Time Estimation ............................................................................................................... 19
Access Control .......................................................................................................................... 20
Commercial Vehicle Screening................................................................................................. 21
Enforcement ................................................................................................................................. 22
Payment ........................................................................................................................................ 23
Travel Behavior Analysis ............................................................................................................ 25
Analysis of Transportation-Specific LPR Data Privacy Risks .................................................. 26
Chapter 3. Legislative, Judicial, Public Opinion Review .......................................................... 31
State Legislative Review of LPR and Privacy .......................................................................... 31
Judicial Review of LPR and Privacy ........................................................................................ 36
Public Opinion Review of LPR and Privacy ............................................................................ 40
Chapter 4. Case Study Summaries .............................................................................................. 47
Travel Time Estimation ............................................................................................................... 47
Access Control .......................................................................................................................... 50
Commercial Vehicle Screening................................................................................................. 54
Tolling and Payment .................................................................................................................... 60
Travel Behavior Analysis ............................................................................................................ 64
Conclusions from Case Studies ................................................................................................... 68
Chapter 5: Best Practices in Privacy Protection ........................................................................ 70
Transparency and Openness ........................................................................................................ 71

5

Purpose Specification .................................................................................................................. 73
Data Minimization, Retention, and Use Limitation .................................................................... 74
Data Quality and Accuracy ....................................................................................................... 75
Accountability .............................................................................................................................. 76
Security ..................................................................................................................................... 77
Chapter 6: Conclusions, Recommendations, and Suggested Future Research ...................... 79
Conclusions .................................................................................................................................. 79
Recommendations ........................................................................................................................ 80
Further Research .......................................................................................................................... 81
References ....................................................................................................................................... 83
Appendix: Interview Questionnaire ............................................................................................ 89

6

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES
Table 1. LPR Algorithm Processes to License Plate Identification ................................................ 14
Figure 1. Illustration of the LPR Data Reduction Process .............................................................. 15
Figure 2. LPR Data from Oakland Law Enforcement .................................................................... 17
Table 2. Summary of Data Types and Links by Transportation Use ............................................ 18
Table 3. Summary of Agencies Involved in Transportation Uses .................................................. 19
Figure 3. Travel Time Estimation Summary Details .................................................................... 20
Figure 4. Access Control Summary Details .................................................................................. 21
Figure 5. Commercial Vehicle Screening Summary Details......................................................... 22
Figure 6. Commercial Vehicle Screening Summary Details......................................................... 23
Figure 7. Payment Summary Details ............................................................................................... 24
Figure 8. Travel Behavior Analysis Summary Details.................................................................. 26
Figure 9. Privacy Risk Function (Brooks and Nadeau 2015)........................................................ 26
Figure 10. Relative Likelihood of Privacy Problems .................................................................... 27
Figure 11. Relative Magnitude of Harm from Privacy Problems ................................................... 28
Figure 12. Visualizing Privacy Risk ............................................................................................. 28
Figure 13. Privacy Risk for Transportation Uses of LPR................................................................. 29
Table 4. LPR Use Case Category Descriptions ............................................................................... 31
Table 5. State Laws Addressing Privacy Concerns from LPR Use .............................................. 32
Figure 14. Frequency of Occurrence of LPR Use Cases Addressed in Legislation ...................... 33
Table 6. LPR Legal Requirement Descriptions ............................................................................... 34
Figure 15. Frequency of Occurrence of ALPR Legal Requirements.............................................. 35
Table 7. Data Destruction Requirements by State......................................................................... 36
Figure 16. Public Perceptions of Privacy and Security in the Post-Snowden Era, Pew Research
Center, November 12, 2014 .............................................................................................. 41
Figure 17. Public Perceptions of Privacy and Security in the Post-Snowden Era, Pew Research
Center, November 12, 2014 .............................................................................................. 43
Table 8. Privacy Protection Principles for LPRs ............................................................................... 71

vii

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ACLU
ALPR
AVST
CVISN
DMV
DOT
DSRC
FDOT
FHWA
FMCSA
FTC
GIS
GPS
HOT
HOV
IACP
ISMS
ISO
ITS
LPR
MAC
MPO
NCHRP
NIST
OCR
OECD
PARSS
PCI
PII
RFID
SCC
TxDOT
USDOT
VMT
WIM

American Civil Liberties Union
automated license plate reader
audio video surveillance technology
Commercial Vehicle Information Systems and Networks
Department of Motor Vehicles
Department of Transportation
dedicated short range communications
Florida Department of Transportation
Federal Highway Administration
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
Federal Trade Commission
geographic information system
global positioning systems
high occupancy toll
High occupancy vehicle
International Association of Chiefs of Police
information security management system
International Organization for Standardization
intelligent transportation systems
License plate reader
Media Access Control
Metropolitan planning organization

National Cooperative Highway Research Program
National Institute of Standards and Technology
optical character recognition
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
Performance Registration Information Systems and Management based automated
ramp screening system
Payment Card Industry
personally identifiable information
radio frequency identification
Security Standards Council
Texas Department of Transportation
United States Department of Transportation
vehicle miles traveled
weigh-in-motion

8

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The research reported herein was performed under NCHRP Project 08-36, Task 136 by the
Texas A&M Transportation Institute (TTI), a member of The Texas A&M University System.
Johanna Zmud of TTI was the Principal Investigator. Co-investigators were Jason Wagner and
Maarit Moran of TTI; James P. George of the Texas A&M School of Law. Other members of the
research team were Shawn Turner of TTI; and Michalis Xyntarakis and Anita Vandervalk of
Cambridge Systematics.
The researchers would like to thank the following individuals for their assistance in the case
studies and participation in interviews:


























J.D. Allen, Alliance Transportation Group
Paul Clark, Florida Department of Transportation
Jeff Davis, Port of Houston
Stephen Davis, Port of Beaumont
Anthony Guckert, The Traffic Group
Dean Gustafson, Virginia Department of Transportation
Dell Hamilton, Texas A&M Transportation Services
Ed Hard, Texas A&M Transportation Institute
Allison Hardt, Maryland State Highway Administration
Eric Hemphill, North Texas Tollway Authority
Fred Herrey, Florida Department of Transportation
Steve Jack, Virginia Department of Transportation
Stave Kalina, Arizona Department of Transportation
Brian Kary, Minnesota Department of Transportation
Tom Kelly, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
Casey Langford, Tennessee Department of Transportation and University of Tennessee
Richard McDonough, New York State Department of Transportation
Galen McGill, Oregon Department of Transportation
Tyler Patterson, Washington State Department of Transportation
Robert Pierce, Port of Galveston
Guy Rousseau, Atlanta Regional Commission
Erik Sabina, Colorado Department of Transportation
Sean Strawbridge, Port of Corpus Christi
Carlos Zaldivar, Miami-Dade Expressway Authority
Beth Zelinski, Bay Area Toll Authority

9

ABSTRACT
NCHRP Report/Task 136: License Plate Reader Technology: Transportation Uses and
Privacy Risks, presents a review of transportation uses of license plate reader (LPR) technology,
relevant regulatory and judicial cases, and current trends in public opinion. Detailed case studies
were completed for five transportation uses to assess current context, benefits, and challenges.
Guidance on strategies and practices is provided to guide transportation agencies in balancing
between beneficial uses of LPR data and the protection of individual privacy. These best
practices should be understood as the minimum aspirations for an agency’s policies, procedures,
and controls. Due to the unique requirements of individual agencies and their differing
geographies, uses, and experiences, no one set of best practices will be applicable to all
organizations.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Privacy is defined as the capability of individuals to determine for themselves when, how,
and to what extent information about them is communicated to others. Privacy relates to the
likelihood of disclosure of personally identifiable information (PII) about an individual and the
magnitude of harm that might result. PII is information that by itself or in combination with other
information can identify, locate, or distinguish an individual. License plate reader (LPR) systems
consist of high-speed cameras combined with sophisticated computer algorithms capable of
converting the images of license plates into computer-readable data. The system automates the
collection of license plate numbers. A license plate number does not identify a specific person;
rather it identifies a vehicle. However, the license plate number may be linked or associated with
an identifiable person through a linkage with other information about the individual. As a result,
while license plate numbers are not inherently PII, their common affiliations and linkages with
individuals constitutes an increased risk to privacy.
The use of LPR technology for transportation purposes is not new. Applications stem
from the 1990s as technologies such as geographic information system (GIS), global positioning
systems (GPS), and cellular telephones were identified as means toward safer and more efficient
data collection, improved data quality, and reduced costs. LPR, like other new technologies of
the time, was viewed as a “technological fix” for the cost challenges associated with capturing
required information for transportation planning and policy making. The privacy risks associated
with LPR use would be weighed against the real and perceived benefits of a particular use.
Five transportation uses were assessed regarding privacy risks: travel time estimation,
access control, commercial vehicle screening, tolling and payment, and travel behavior analysis.
Payment and travel behavior analysis uses were found to present the highest potential overall
risk. Payment uses may link vehicle data from LPR to an individual user account that includes
financial information. The presence of financial information contributes to a higher possibility of
a problem occurring because of the opportunity for fraud, identity theft or economic loss. In
contrast, travel behavior involved a high potential for harm because it was the use most likely to
incorporate detailed information about individual’s behavior. The opportunity for harm increases
as individual actions are recorded at multiple locations and times, making it possible for an
individual’s actions to be tracked. The transportation use with the lowest privacy risk was travel
time estimates, which match plates at two points in time. If license plate data cannot be linked to
an individual, then PII is not at risk.
Researchers found that uses focusing on commercial vehicle activity, which may be
operationally similar to passenger uses, present a lower likelihood of privacy problems for an
individual because of the commercial environment of freight. Commercial vehicles are highly
regulated and, although a driver is a private citizen, the activities of the driver and vehicle are
associated with a commercial operation. This is not to suggest that commercial vehicle uses of
LPR may not result in important privacy threats, but that the impact on an individual’s privacy is
comparatively lower for freight uses.
There are regulatory and legal aspects to assessing privacy risks, but the legal landscape
is a moving target. Privacy protection in the U.S. is granted not by a single national law
regulating privacy, as in Europe, but by a patchwork of federal and state laws and regulations.
Recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions on individuals’ locational privacy have been conflicting or
left key questions unresolved. One of the most recent high court decisions indicated that “an
individual lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy on open, public roads”; while another held
that the “warrantless collection of location data over an extended period constitutes a search,”
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and, therefore, violates a person’s expectation of privacy. It is important to highlight, however,
that LPR use is legal in all states with varying levels of restrictions, and it is unlikely that
transportation agency users would face civil liability for their work with the technology.
However, public concerns regarding privacy might curtail its future application for transportation
purposes. Today, there remains a tension expressed in public opinion about the desire for more
or less government intervention in privacy protection. A review of public opinion trends, as
presented in Chapter 3 of this report, revealed that the more LPR use is seen as general
surveillance, the more likely the public are to find it problematic.
The implementation of the best practices presented in this report will serve to mitigate
privacy risks associated with LPR use. LPR systems fall into a special category of modern data
collection technologies that have the potential to identify unique individuals. Thus, LPR
application is likely to receive greater scrutiny in the future. The implementation of the following
practices can serve as insurance against future privacy-related challenges.


Transparency and openness: Agencies should notify or otherwise communicate
the types of information they collect and how that information is used,
disseminated, and shared to individuals within their jurisdictions.



Purpose specification: Agencies should clearly communicate why they are
collecting information and under what authority; a change in purpose requires an
update of the communication.



Data minimization, retention, and use limitation: Agencies should only collect
information that is necessary to meet their specified purpose, retain it for only as
long as needed, and restrict its use to only specified purposes.



Data quality and accuracy: Agencies should ensure that data are accurate, of
high quality, and – when relevant – enable individuals to review and correct any
information.



Accountability: Agencies should define explicit policies and procedures for
complying with data protection principles.



Security: Agencies should protect personal data with reasonable measures to
prevent loss, unauthorized access or disclosure.

Because of uncertainty in the future legal environment, and in how the public perceives
LPR use for transportation purposes, the research team recommends that agencies monitor
evolving state legislation and judicial cases involving data privacy in general, and LPR use
specifically, as well as public opinion trends in their specific jurisdictions.
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CHAPTER 1. BACKGROUND
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE
The objective of the research was to provide an analytic foundation for transportation
agencies evaluating the use of LPR technology. The research identified the major transportation
uses of LPR, their associated privacy risks, and best practices for mitigating those risks. This
information will guide transportation agencies as they navigate the potential applications of
technologies, such as LPRs, that streamline the acquisition and analysis of data and that automate
or enhance many existing work processes. For example, the regular automated collection of
information from traffic flows can enable agencies to better understand how their road networks
function, identify trouble areas, and deploy targeted resources to improve operations. Automating
data collection can also increase the efficiency of previously manual processes, like collecting tolls
or screening freight vehicles.
The scope of this research is transportation uses of LPR and best practices for
transportation agencies. However, LPR is frequently used by law enforcement agencies, and
significant attention has been paid to these uses by the media and civil liberties organizations. An
effort was made in this research to exclude law enforcement uses except where directly relevant to
a transportation audience. The use of LPR to track stolen vehicles, enforce speed limits, conduct
criminal investigations and other clear law enforcement operations are not included in this report.
The most notable inclusion of law enforcement references is in the legal review. Law enforcement
activity is a common focus of legal and statutory requirements related to privacy and LPR, and
often applies to transportation agencies as well. In another example, commercial vehicle screening
is often executed by officers from law enforcement agencies, but is considered a transportation
safety and planning activity. The potential for, and risks from, “data bleed” between transportation
agencies and law enforcement are also considered in this research.
The use of LPR technology for transportation purposes is not new. Applications stem from
the 1990s as technologies such as GIS, GPS, and cellular telephones were identified as means
toward more efficient data collection, improved data quality, reduced costs, and more flexible
output products. LPR, like other new technologies of the time, was viewed as a “technological fix”
for the cost challenges associated with capturing required information for transportation planning
and policy making. However, even at the time, an opposing perspective viewed LPR as a “big
brother-like” force with negative implications for individual privacy. “Privacy” is defined as the
capability of individuals to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information
about them is communicated to others. This tension between increasing transportation system
efficiency and the specter of privacy risks for individuals exists today.
Thus, this research explored the privacy implications of major transportation use cases and
provides information for transportation agencies in developing policies governing their use of LPR
data that adequately address privacy concerns. In this research:
 The major use cases have been identified through literature review.
 Privacy implications were investigated through reviews of literature, state regulations, and
applicable federal laws and court cases.
 State of the practice by transportation agencies was examined through case studies of the
major use cases.
 Best practices were synthesized from literature review and case studies.
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The following sections provide the context for the research by describing how LPR
technology works, followed by an overview of privacy considerations.
LPR TECHNOLOGY
At their most basic, LPRs are a technology that enables organizations to automatically
identify a vehicle by the alphanumeric characters on a license plate (Roberts and Casanova 2012).
LPRs function through pairing cameras with a specialized computer software: cameras record an
image of a plate, and then a computer translates the image into alphanumeric characters electronic
systems can understand. Multiple cameras or video cameras are sometimes used to increase the
likelihood a readable image is captured; a traditional high-speed camera is often paired with an
infrared camera. Additional illumination, like visible or infrared flashes, is also commonly used.
Low-quality images can decrease data accuracy, which is a common challenge associated with
LPRs. Combining multiple camera and flash types creates redundancy, reducing the impact from
poor lighting or glare, which commonly occurs at dusk or dawn periods.
Once the camera(s) capture an image of sufficient quality, the image is sent to a computer
system that uses a series of algorithms to analyze the image, identify and isolate a license plate,
and reduce and render the image into the essential alphanumeric characters. This process takes
place in six steps (Table 1), and is illustrated in Figure 1 (Roberts and Cassanova 2012, p. 10).
Table 1. LPR Algorithm Processes to License Plate Identification
Algorithm Step

Description

Plate Localization
Plate Orientation & Sizing
Normalization
Character Segmentation
Optical Character
Recognition
Syntactical/Geometric
Analysis

Finding and isolating the plate in the picture
Compensating for plate skew and adjusting dimensions
Adjusting for brightness and contrast
Finding and isolating individual characters on the plate
Translating images to digital text
Checking characters and positions against state-specific rules to
determine a plate’s state of issuance

Source: Roberts and Casanova 2012, p. 10

Once the plate is isolated and characters segmented, the optical character recognition
(OCR) algorithm makes a probabilistic guess as to which alphanumeric characters exist on the
plate. If the image is low quality or other problems exist, the algorithm will have to make a lowerprobability guess. When the computer’s confidence in its guess is below a set probability
threshold, the image and associated information are commonly sent to a human for review.
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Figure 1. Illustration of the LPR Data Reduction Process
Beyond lighting conditions, there are a variety of factors that affect the probability a LPR
system correctly identifies a plate, including










Plate and character colors;
Plate design;
State of origin;
Plate covers or obstructions;
Plate location;
Vehicle headways;
Vehicle speed;
Lighting and weather conditions; and
LPR orientation and system quality.

When an image is recorded, the system also records and bundles additional contextuallyrelevant data – called metadata – into an aggregated file. The file often contains information
including (Roberts and Casannova 2012, p. 13-15)







The original contextual color image;
A black-and-white rendering of the image;
The OCR electronically-readable plate file;
Longitude/latitude coordinates;
Time and date; and
LPR system ID.

Once the image is translated, the transportation agency uses the information – along with
the associated metadata – according to their specific needs. Commonly LPRs are used to collect
payments and tolls, screen freight, control access to parking and other facilities, and conduct travel
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behavior analyses. Some other uses such as travel time estimation have fallen out of favor for a
variety of reasons. There are also law enforcement uses that are outside of the research scope.
LPRs can function as either permanent roadside units or mobile on-board units. The most
common incarnation transportation agencies use is the permanent roadside unit. Law enforcement
agencies often use mobile units to perform surveillance or enforcement across a community, but
transport agencies do not normally use these for their purposes.
DATA PRIVACY CONCERNS
As with other technologies relying on public data collection, which can sometimes be
personally identifiable or sensitive, there are concerns that the information collected from LPRs
could be misused or insufficiently protected against privacy risks. Agencies must balance the
benefits from using LPRs against the risks and concerns associated with misuse of sensitive data.
Privacy is defined as the capability of individuals to “determine for themselves when, how,
and to what extent information about them is communicated to others” (Westin 1967). This is
particularly relevant to privacy of PII. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
defines PII as “any information about an individual maintained by an agency, including
1) Any information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual‘s identity, such as
name, social security number, date and place of birth, mother‘s maiden name, or biometric
records; and
2) Any other information that is linked or linkable to an individual, such as medical,
educational, financial, and employment information.”
It is important to note that PII is a mutable and malleable concept; there is no single list of
what constitutes PII. A single piece of data can be PII, provided it can be used to distinguish or
trace an individual’s identity, such as a social security number. Likewise, merging multiple pieces
of individually innocuous data can become PII, even when the individual pieces are not (i.e.,
combining date of birth plus a personal address).
Similarly, a publically displayed license plate number, by itself, does not constitute PII. But
when aggregated and/or combined with metadata (like location, date and time), or linked to
associated information (like a Department of Motor Vehicles [DMV] record), a license plate
number can become PII. With regard to metadata, special interest groups have protested
widespread law enforcement use of LPR, which they fear – when aggregated and combined with
metadata – would provide the government with detailed knowledge of where and when
individual’s travel (American Civil Liberties Union 2013). To illustrate this point, the Electronic
Frontier Foundation created a graphic (Figure 2) depicting eight days of LPR reads from the
Oakland Police Department (Gillula and Maas 2015). The data points represent 63,000 LPR reads,
48,000 unique plates, and 39,000 plates that were captured only once, using as few as two carmounted LPR systems. The moveable LPR systems captured plate data from across Oakland, with
a particular focus on low-income neighborhoods. When combined with census data or crime
statistics, there are a number of ways that the data could be analyzed to identify individual
patterns. In a similar case in Minnesota, the Minneapolis Star Tribune was able to track the local
Mayor’s location using databases with historic LPR data. This news story raised concerns, and set
off a legislative debate about the proper balance between law enforcement needs and privacy
protections (Roper 2014).
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Source: Gillula and Maas, 2015

Figure 2. LPR Data from Oakland Law Enforcement
Advocacy groups worry that widespread and unfettered uses of LPR systems would harm
individual’s privacy by informing the government, or other actors if the information is released, to
the daily travel patterns and location information of individuals. The American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) has expressed concerns that long-term retention of license plate data, as well as
sharing of this data among multiple agencies, creates an environment in which the data could be
used abusively by individuals or by institutions. Such data, especially when amassed and stored for
long periods, could be used inappropriately to identify religious, political affiliations, and personal
relationships; betray frequent trips to the local gym, medical center, or bar district; and provide
other intimate details about an individual they do not wish to publically divulge.
REPORT ORGANIZATION
After this introduction, the report is organized into the following sections:


Chapter 2: Major Transportation Uses and Privacy Risk Taxonomy



Chapter 3: Legislative and Judicial Review



Chapter 4: Case Study Summaries



Chapter 5: Best Practices



Chapter 6: Conclusions and Suggested Research
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CHAPTER 2. MAJOR TRANSPORTATION USES AND PRIVACY RISK
TAXONOMY
Researchers reviewed current and potential transportation uses of LPR technology. Six use
cases are presented in this section: travel time estimates; access; commercial vehicle screening;
enforcement; payment; and travel behavior analysis.
Each use case is identified by the types of data collected, links to other data sets, and
agencies involved as observed in the literature review for each use case. A summary of data types
collected and links to other data sources for each use case is presented in Table 2. In most use
cases, the data collected from LPRs were similar, and included the license plate number, photo,
and the date, time and location it was taken. Freight screening and enforcement uses were noted
for, in some examples, including photos of the vehicle and surrounding environment. LPR data
was most commonly linked to vehicle registration data, individual user accounts or to other data
points in the same study area.
Table 2. Summary of Data Types and Links by Transportation Use
Transportation Use Cases of LPR

Data Types

Types and Links

License plate
numbers and photo
Date, time and
location
Photo of vehicle
and/or surroundings

Travel Time
Estimation

Access
Control

Commercial
Vehicle
Screening

Enforcement

Payment

Travel
Behavior
Analysis

X

x

x

x

x

x

X

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

Data Links

Link to a user
account
Link to vehicle
registration
Link to financial
account information
Link to United
States Department
of Transportation
(USDOT) freight
registration account
Link two or more
locations in a study
area
Link to Census data

x

x

x

x

x

x
x

X

x

x

x

Table 3 identifies agencies involved with each transportation use. Departments of
transportation were commonly involved in five out of the six transportation uses of LPR. Other
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frequent users include parking authorities, cities, transportation planning organizations, and
enforcement agencies. Private organizations were also identified, including toll authorities,
universities, airports and academic institutions.
Table 3. Summary of Agencies Involved in Transportation Uses
Transportation Use Cases of LPR
Agency Type

Travel Time
Estimation

State Departments of
Transportation (DOTs)

x

Cities
Metropolitan planning
organizations (MPOs),
Transportation planning
organizations

Access
Control

Commercial
Vehicle
Screening

Enforcement

Payment

Travel
Behavior
Analysis

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

Commercial vehicle
enforcement

x

Traffic enforcement

x

Toll authorities

x

x

x

x

Parking authorities

x

Universities, Airports or
Medical Campuses

x

It is important to note that several uses may overlap in practice, but they are distinguished
here to highlight the aspects of each use that increase the probability and impact of privacy risk.
The following subsections provide a detailed discussion of each transportation use. Combinations
of uses are addressed further in the next section. In this section, the use cases are ordered loosely
from lower threat to higher threat of privacy risk.
TRAVEL TIME ESTIMATION
Travel activity of vehicles on the road is commonly collected and used to calculate travel
time estimates (see Figure 3). Estimated or predicted travel times are often relayed to drivers in
real-time through variable message signs or other communication methods. This information is
used in construction and work zones where traffic flow is atypical, but can also be used in travel
demand management and intelligent transportation systems (ITS) programs.
Travel times can be collected manually, using a portable computer or through manual
transcription of video. The development of LPR technology has offered a convenient and cost-
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effective tool for this process. Travel time estimates can be calculated based on LPR scans at two
or more points along a corridor. An LPR tag from one data collection site is matched to the same
license plate at another location along the study area. This information is compared to calculate a
travel time between these fixed locations. Only the LPR time stamps are used to calculate a travel
time, which does not necessitate direct use of the license plate number or linking to other
information.
Uses

Data Types and Links

Travel time estimation
Communicating travel information
Setting variable toll rates

License plate numbers and photo
Date, time and location

Agencies Involved

Issues

DOTs
MPOs, Transportation planning organizations
Research/academic institutions

The Federal Highway Administration
(FHWA) suggests destroying all license plate
records once travel times have been computed
to avoid potential privacy problems (FHWA
1998).
Other technologies may provide an alternative
technique for travel time measurements (ITS
International 2013).

References
In 2005, the Oregon DOT compared automated license plate reader (ALPR)–based travel time
prediction results to probe-based travel time observations on a 25-mile stretch of rural
highway. The results found no statistical difference between the predicted travel times and
those observed by probe vehicles. The cameras read license plate numbers and associate them
with time-stamped tags. According to Bertini et al. (2005), the license plate numbers are
“privacy-protected” with encryption and sent to a central server. Data retention policies were
not discussed in this report. This project contributed to the broad goal to determine whether
LPR data could be used to present travel time estimates to drivers on the road and allow them
to make travel decisions (Bertini, Lasky, and Monsere 2005).
LPR technology is used to generate predictive travel time information in real time and present
the information via variable messaging signs on roadways across England. Real-time journey
times are collected based on license plate readings and combined with historic travel times.
This report does not mention the retention time for data or strategies to anonymize the data
(Burton, Crosthwaite, Simpson, and Billington. 2015).
Figure 3. Travel Time Estimation Summary Details
ACCESS CONTROL
LPR technology is used for access control in ports, parking lots and other secured areas
(see Figure 4). LPR for access may be used in any facility which restricts vehicles that may enter
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and exit. In access uses, an LPR is typically mounted adjacent to an automatic barrier (e.g. gate,
fence) at the entrance to a facility. It reads an approaching vehicle license and matches it to a list of
authorized vehicles. A correct match will raise the barrier automatically. This system preempts the
need for access card, radio frequency identifications (RFIDs) or other devices to be issued to new
drivers.

Uses

Data Types and Links

Secure facilities (such as ports)
Parking lots
University parking permit programs.

License plate numbers and photo
Date, time and location
Link to user account

Agencies Involved

Issues

Cities
Parking Authorities
Universities and Medical Campuses
Airports

Unlike travel time estimates, LPR data used for
access control may be linked to other databases.
Historical data may be saved from access
management systems for business purposes or to
provide data to customers.

References
Project Seahawk was a port and intermodal security pilot project that included LPR installations at the
Port of Charleston (US Department of Justice 2009).
See private parking provider NuPark, a “provider of LPR focused parking solutions”. The company is
headquartered in Cedar Park, TX (NuPark 2016).

Figure 4. Access Control Summary Details
COMMERCIAL VEHICLE SCREENING
Truck screening, detection and compliance are common practices for state and national
agencies (see Figure 5). LPR technology was one strategy identified in a National Cooperative
Highway Research Program (NCHRP) study on innovative strategies for gathering truck activity
data (Zmud, Lawson, and Pisarski 2014). Common issues that are screened for are expired
registration, proper certifications, and oversize and overweight violations. It can also be used for
speed monitoring (Oliveira-Neto, Han, and Jeong. 2009). LPR technology is used to identify trucks
by license plate number and match the vehicle to existing databases for violations or other flags.
LPR is often combined with other technologies including weigh-in-motion (WIM) devices and
video imaging to detect over-size vehicles. Similar to open road tolling, LPR can be used to speed
up these screening processes.
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Uses

Data Types and Links

Screening
Compliance
WIM

License plate numbers and photo
Date, time and location
USDOT registration number
Photo of vehicle and/or surroundings
Truck size, weight and other defining features
Truck LPR data may be linked to USDOT
registration information and freight databases.

Agencies Involved

Issues

DOTs
Commercial Vehicle Enforcement

Commercial vehicle uses may be less “alarming”
to the public than passenger vehicles; drivers
operate in a highly regulated environment already.

References
Kentucky has 14 fixed inspection stations in the state for size and weight, safety registration and
credentials enforcement of commercial vehicles. More than four million trucks passed through the
stations in 2011. The trucks are weighed by the automatic WIM equipment but only 1% are inspected.
Inspection stations are maintained by the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet and staffed by Kentucky
State Police – Commercial Vehicle Enforcement.
The Performance Registration Information Systems and Management based automated ramp screening
system (PARSS) was developed in order to identify and screen every vehicle that enters the Boone
County, Kentucky inspection station. The system is used to track for violations in safety and
compliance. PARSS provides automated screening of trucks based on the license plate number and the
USDOT number displayed on the vehicle. Two ALPR systems read the license plate number and
jurisdiction from the front of the vehicle. The project tested two different LPRs in order to allow for a
side-by-side comparison.
In addition to LPR, the system included an automated USDOT number reader, a scene camera that
allows for a general description of the vehicle for visual identification purposes, an interface linking to
the existing WIM and truck sorting and tracking system, and a screening database containing national
and state information regarding safety, registration and credentials. This database is updated daily. This
is all connected to a computer in the inspection station. While the system is designed to be automatic,
enforcement personnel are shown the LPR results and compared to the photographs so that corrections
can be made immediately.

Figure 5. Commercial Vehicle Screening Summary Details
ENFORCEMENT
LPR technology has been applied to transportation applications to enforce toll facility
regulations, parking regulations as well as other traffic violations (see Figure 6). LPR is a
foundation technology for all electronic open road tolling, because the license plate is the least
common denominator for all vehicles passing through a roadway. Many toll facilities use an invehicle transponder to track users, but not all vehicles will be equipped with these devices. While
LPR can serve as the central tool to facilitate toll use, more often it is used in combination with
other technologies to identify violators and manage casual users who may not have a transponder
unit. LPR can be used to identify violators of toll road vehicle occupancy or time of day
restrictions. The license plate information is then linked to the registration data to send a violation
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notice to the registered owner or to an enforcement agent in real-time. As noted earlier, law
enforcement is not the focus of this research but in some cases law enforcement agencies may
enforce transportation-related violations. Cities and parking authorities use LPR to check license
plates for parking and traffic violations.
Uses

Data Types and Links

High occupancy vehicle (HOV), high
occupancy toll (HOT), managed lane and toll
violations, Parking and other traffic violations

License plate number and photo
Date, time and location
Photo of vehicle (including occupancy) and/or
surroundings
Link to vehicle registration database
Link to toll user account

Agencies Involved

Issues

State DOTs
Cities
Parking authorities
Traffic enforcement agencies
Toll authorities

Data sharing conventions can directly impact
the potential for privacy risks from LPR data
uses. In 2015, legislation was being
considered in Pittsburgh, PA, to allow license
plate data collected by the Parking Authority
be shared with the police force.
The combination of multiple data streams and
technologies can increase privacy risk. Most
toll road and fee charging systems use a
combination of technologies to manage the
collection and enforcement process. 1

References
A study for the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) demonstrated the use of LPR
data to detect and enforce vehicle occupancy counts for carpool vehicles in an HOV lane. The
LPR data is linked with additional photos that capture the vehicle occupancy. The vehicle is
then compared to a “whitelist” of frequent carpool vehicle license plate numbers. The report
notes that the integration of these three datasets necessitated “multiple layers of security to
protect the privacy of this information” including password protection.
Figure 6. Commercial Vehicle Screening Summary Details
PAYMENT
LPR can be used as a method of payment for toll roads, congestion pricing programs, and
parking (see Figure 7). Open road tolling systems eliminate the need to stop at a tollbooth and
allow drivers to travel at a normal speed. LPR data is used to link a passing vehicle to the
1

For example, dedicated short range communications (DSRC) on-board units may be used for the primary payment
method and LPR technology used for enforcement and casual-user transactions. DSRC offers higher accuracy at a
lower operating cost, while LPR can address casual users and provide enforcement to overcome DSRC limitations.
There may be value in this system in that LPR is only used in some transactions, possibly decreasing spending and
reducing the number of people subject to the associated risk.
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registered owner, who is then sent a bill that often includes an administrative fee for the
processing. In parking management, the LPR system captures the license plate number along with
the time and date. When the car later exits, the license plate is captured again and the fee is
computed based on the data. This eliminates issues of lost tickets, swapped tickets, cashier fraud or
stolen cars. LPR is more commonly used in the US for toll payment violation enforcement (see
Enforcement), but some toll facilities that use electronic open-road tolling are using LPR systems
more broadly for toll payment. As this type of tolling expands, the use of LPR for this purpose
may increase as well.
Uses

Data Types and Links

Open Road Tolling
Congestion pricing programs
Parking fees

License plate numbers and photo
Date, time and location
Link to vehicle registration
Link to toll user account
Link to financial account information
Link two or more locations in a study area
(see Parking example above)

Agencies Involved

Issues

State DOTs
Cities
Toll Authorities
Parking Authorities
Private parking operators

Historical records could provide information
on individual behavior and whereabouts.
Link to financial information has the potential
to result in more harmful impact from a
privacy risk.

References
LPR is a key technology used to facilitate the London Congestion Charging Program,
including both enforcement and payment uses. More than 1,300 cameras are located within the
charging area boundaries to record license plates of entering and exiting vehicles. The plates
are matched against a database of account holders and charges are applied monthly to a debit
or credit card. Drivers without an account can pay in advance or will receive a notice by mail
(Transport for London 2016).
Multiple tolled highways in Florida use all-electric tolling that relies on LPR to formulate
monthly invoices for customers who do not use the SunPass transponders that are also offered
as a method of payment. LPR capture the license plate information which is then linked to the
vehicle registration data. “Toll-by-Plate” customers are charged a $2.50 administrative fee
(Florida DOT 2016).
On Virginia’s Elizabeth River Tunnels, a Pay by Plate option is available for one
time/occasional use travelers or unregistered local residents. According to operator Elizabeth
River Crossings, “By law, once the customer pays the invoice, Elizabeth River Crossings must
delete all the information from the system within 30 days, so these accounts are not
permanent” (Elizabeth River Crossings 2016).
Figure 7. Payment Summary Details

24

TRAVEL BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS
Similar to the collection of travel time data, a network of LPR cameras can be used for the
monitoring of entry and exit points over a network of roads to support other analysis (see Figure
8). Capturing the travel of individual vehicles on road segments can inform origin-destination
matrices for transportation models and planning. In some cases, such as external station travel
studies, the privacy risk would be relatively low because the LPR data does not require a link to
other datasets. However, LPR data used for travel behavior efforts may be linked to other personal
information such as vehicle registration and home or work locations. Matching license plates
against vehicle registration data can be used to infer the ultimate origin or destination or
demographic information about the traveler. By matching the license plate data to the DMV
records, individual vehicle ownership data, such as vehicle makes, model year, vehicle body styles,
fuel type, personal or commercial vehicles, can be obtained (Lee and Williams 2014).
Uses

Data Types and Links

Origin-Destination studies
Travel behavior studies

License plate numbers and photo
Date, time and location
Two or more locations in a study area
Link to vehicle registration data Link to
Census Block-level demographic data
samples (based on registered owner’s home
address)

Agencies Involved

Issues

DOTs
MPOs
Air Quality Management Agencies
Research/academic institutions

What are the existing standards for
researchers to get approval to match LPR data
to vehicle registrations?

References
In a conversion of Georgia’s I-85 HOV lane to HOT lane, LPRs were used in a before-andafter study of the facility and its users. Several studies linked license plate numbers to the
Georgia state vehicle registration database to identify the home location of the vehicle owners.
This data was linked to Census block groups and that data was used for analysis. Data
methods for personal information were not discussed in the research. See Khoeini et al. (2012)
and D’Ambrosio et al. (2011).
Automated road travel survey is a method that combines LPR data, motor vehicle records and
census data, devised to improve upon an existing travel survey method (i.e., travel diaries).
Researchers in Los Angeles used LPR data collected by the South Coast Air Quality
Management District to link license plate numbers to California DMV registration records.
Addresses from the registration database were used to match travelers to Census block groups,
as a proxy for demographic information.
In one study, LPR, or automatic number plate recognition, cameras provided the data used to
analyze the impacts of a London Tube (metro) strike on the traffic travel times. The LPR
technology scans and matches vehicle license plates at the entrance and exit of a travel link,
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with journey time data at 5 minute intervals. This study used camera data from 670 travel
links totaling a length of 140 km. The data was used to calculate total travel times for sub-city
areas, road links, segments, and time of day. It reviewed impacts on the network between the
first day of each strike and the following days, changes in departure and arrival times, travel
time variation throughout the day (in three broad areas of the network), and a comparison of
inbound versus outbound traffic of the three broad areas.
Figure 8. Travel Behavior Analysis Summary Details
ANALYSIS OF TRANSPORTATION-SPECIFIC LPR DATA PRIVACY RISKS
To understand the data privacy risks specific to transportation uses of LPR, the research
team developed a taxonomy for classifying LPR for transportation uses. A taxonomy provides a
way of defining groups of things on the basis of shared characteristics and giving names to those
groups. In this case, the taxonomy is based upon the concept of privacy risk.
Privacy risk is defined as a function of “the likelihood that a data action causes problems
for individuals, such as loss of trust or economic loss, and the impact of the problematic data
action” (Brooks and Nadeau 2015). A data action is defined as an information system practice that
processes personal information. Collection, retention, logging, generation, transformation,
disclosure, and transfer are examples of processing. One potentially problematic data action, for
example, is surveillance – in which personal information is used to track the activities and
whereabouts of an individual in a way that may not be proportional to the service being provided.
However, in some contexts, surveillance via closed-circuit television cameras in public areas may
constitute for some people a valued trade-off between privacy and safety or security.
Privacy risk can be simply represented by the equation in Figure 9.

Figure 9. Privacy Risk Function (Brooks and Nadeau 2015)
Healthcare provides another example of the trade-offs involved in evaluation of personal
privacy risk. Electronic medical records include address information, physical attributes, family
history, prescriptions, medical conditions, insurance and payment information about a patient.
Electronic medical records may improve the quality and delivery of medical care, but these
digitized records may also leave sensitive personal information vulnerable to a privacy breach. A
breach may be accidental, such as if an administrator sends a test result to the wrong specialist, or
intentional, if a criminal hacks a patient database to steal credit card information or a rogue
employee uses secure data for blackmail. In any case, personal information in such a database can
make an individual more vulnerable to privacy risk.
Privacy risk is a complex legal area that extends beyond the transportation focus of this
research. How license plate data is used influences the degree of privacy risk. Guided by the model
presented in Figure 9, researchers considered and classified transportation applications of LPR in
terms of their likelihood of a privacy problem occurring and the potential magnitude of harm from
the privacy problem. The research team applied these two criteria as a means of analyzing and
categorizing the transportation use cases according to their privacy risk. The criteria allows a
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sorting of the uses based on the probability of privacy problem resulting from a particular use, and
the potential harmful impact of privacy risk to an individual created by the use.
Criteria 1 – Likelihood of a Privacy Problem
The likelihood of a privacy problem occurring is the probability that a data action will
generate a problem for the typical individual whose personal information is processed. Various
factors associated with a particular use will impact the probability that a privacy problem occurs,
as summarized in Figure 10.

Figure 10. Relative Likelihood of Privacy Problems
Uses of LPR that involve real-time applications, such as travel time estimates that provide
real-time information on roadways, raise fewer privacy concerns because personal information is
not central to the use. In contrast, when LPR data is retained or stored (instead of deleted) to
analyze behavior, the privacy risk increases because the sensitive data could be involved in a
problematic data action. Stored data simply allows more time for the data to be disclosed through
an intentional or accidental data action. Second, if recurrent information about an individual’s
actions over time are amassed, that information may be used to track a person’s whereabouts and
activities. Both of these situations increase the probability of privacy issues. Other factors include
the government versus third-party ownership of data, and the geographic comprehensiveness of the
database.
Criteria 2 – Magnitude of Harm from Privacy Problems
Privacy risk is a function of the magnitude of harm a data action creates, multiplied by the
likelihood that the problematic data action occurs.
The harm, or loss incurred, due to a privacy problem may not always be straightforward to
quantify. A data action that leads to financial losses such as credit card fraud, can be quantified in
monetary terms. However, other losses may be ambiguous as agencies try to consider issues such
as the effect of leaking embarrassing activity of individuals, variation of individual perceptions of
privacy risk, and loss of public trust.
The magnitude of harm from a potential privacy risk increases as LPR data is linked to
other data sources. The location of a particular license plate becomes far more meaningful, and
risky, if it is linked to the registered owner of the vehicle. This factor, how LPR data is linked to
other data sources, was used to classify the potential harmful impact of LPR use in transportation.
Uses were evaluated based on the types of data collected and the links made to data sources other
than LPR output. LPRs typically produce a time and date-stamped photo of a vehicle’s license
plate and the corresponding license plate number. Some applications supplement that basic data
with photos of the vehicle, photos of the surroundings, or other characteristics of the vehicle. Other
uses may require linking LPR data to sensitive information about a user, such as personal financial
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information to enable payment applications. As LPR data linkages with sensitive data increase, the
potential for harm increases (Figure 11).

Figure 11. Relative Magnitude of Harm from Privacy Problems
Compiling the Taxonomy
The definition of privacy risk according to the criteria presented above was used to develop
a simple taxonomy of LPR transportation uses. The taxonomy is presented in Figure 12. Privacy
risks can be evaluated on the likelihood of a privacy problem occurring (y-axis) and the magnitude
of the harm that could occur as a result of that problem (x-axis). Each use can be ranked on each
criterion from low (green) to high (red).
A privacy risk can be low likelihood and low impact or high likelihood and high impact.
Agencies can use this taxonomy to prioritize privacy problems. It also identifies problems where
the likelihood and magnitude do not match up. A problem may have a low likelihood of occurring
but, in the unlikely event it does occur, a very severe impact. The consequences of such an action
may warrant mitigation even though the probability of occurrence is low.

Figure 12. Visualizing Privacy Risk
Researchers reviewed five transportation use cases for LPR for privacy risk. The
enforcement and payment uses were combined into one category “tolling and payment” for this
analysis. The findings informed a classification of transportation uses for LPR in terms of their
likelihood of a privacy problem occurring and the potential magnitude of harm from the privacy
problem. The resulting taxonomy of privacy risk for transportation uses of LPR is presented in
Figure 13. The uses are sorted based on the probability of a privacy problem resulting from a
particular use, and the potential harmful impact of privacy risk to an individual created by the use.
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Figure 13. Privacy Risk for Transportation Uses of LPR
The privacy risk associated with LPR use would also be weighed against the real and
perceived benefits of a particular use. However, what constitutes a “reasonable” use of LPR is
subjective and beyond the scope of this taxonomy. Payment systems that offer obvious time or
financial savings for one individual may justify the risk associated with giving up personal
information. A traffic engineer may understand the benefits of improved traffic operations, but
everyday travelers may not experience those benefits.
A higher magnitude of harm was assigned to uses that linked LPR data to other data
sources that could include personal or identifying information. Removing overt identifiers from
data (such as name, address, and some identification numbers) does not ensure that the remaining
information is no longer identifiable. Re-identification through links with other data is possible,
even for some data that have been “anonymized.” The uses discussed above range from involving
no data links (travel time estimates) to potentially linking to sensitive personal information such as
personal accounts and financial information (payment).
Payment uses and travel behavior analysis uses were found to present the highest potential
overall risk. The risk is a function of a high likelihood of risk and a high magnitude of harm.
Payment uses may link vehicle data from LPR to an individual user account that includes financial
information. Financial information contributes to a higher possibility of a problem occurring
because of the opportunity for fraud, identity theft or economic loss. In contrast, travel behavior
involved a high potential for harm because it was the use most likely to incorporate detailed
information about the behavior of individuals. The harm increases as individual actions are
recorded at multiple locations and times, making it possible for an individual’s actions to be
tracked.
The lowest combined privacy risk was assigned to travel time estimates. If license plate
data cannot be linked to an individual, then PII is not at risk. The literature indicated that travel
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time estimation presents a low probability of a privacy problem due to its real-time application
which allows for the LPR data to be deleted once the travel time is calculated. Travel time
estimates also require no information other than the location of a matched license plate. LPR data
is not linked to vehicle registration data or sensitive personal information about individuals. In
contrast, for travel behavior analysis, LPR data may be retained or stored to analyze behavior and
trends. This creates a higher probability of a problematic data action that discloses personal
information inappropriately.
Researchers found that uses that focus on commercial vehicle activity, which may
operationally be similar to passenger uses, present less of a likelihood of creating privacy problems
for an individual because of the commercial environment of freight. Commercial vehicles are
highly regulated and, although a driver is a private citizen, the activities of the driver and the
vehicle are associated with a commercial operation. Freight carriers are held to a higher level of
scrutiny when it comes to their operations on the road in part to protect individuals. Information
about commercial vehicles, such as USDOT number, size, weight, travel schedule and routes, are
closely monitored by federal and state regulations. This is not to suggest that commercial vehicle
uses of LPR may not result in important privacy threats, but that the impact on individuals is
comparatively lower for freight uses.
Several other factors were identified, but not included in the taxonomy, that could impact
the privacy risks created by transportation uses of LPR. One factor is the use of ‘big data’ analytics
to collect, link and analyze trends in diverse data sources. Advanced technologies increasingly
produce data that is aggregated from individual travelers (including smart card data, video
surveillance, emerging connected vehicle data, and data from mobile devices). Whether real-time
or archived, this synthesis of information also increases the ability for a data user to be able to
track the action of an individual through time and space. While this risk may be unlikely, it can be
a serious concern for transportation agencies that are concerned with maintaining public trust.
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CHAPTER 3. LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL, PUBLIC OPINION REVIEW
STATE LEGISLATIVE REVIEW OF LPR AND PRIVACY
Since 2010, 12 states enacted 14 pieces of legislation specifically addressing privacy
concerns and the use of LPR systems. The states were: Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida,
Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, and Vermont.
LPR use is allowed in all of these states with various levels of restriction. As is often the case in
our federalist system of government, these states took different approaches to addressing privacy
concerns from LPR use. The laws target a variety of different entities, uses, and take different
steps to reduce privacy risks from these sources.
The team analyzed and categorized state laws according to the transportation use cases.
This was accomplished by reviewing the text of a particular law and determining if any of the
measures placed requirements on (or otherwise addressed) any of these specific uses. The crosswalk between the laws and the transportation use cases contained some conceptual noise because
of the language used in the legislation. For this reason, the research team made some minor
modifications to the use case categories from those presented in the previous chapter (see Table
4). For example, while law enforcement is explicitly outside the scope of this particular project,
it was a very common target of legal requirements.
Table 4. LPR Use Case Category Descriptions
LPR Use Case
Access & Parking

Description

Traffic Enforcement

Using LPR to control access to a parking facility, or for other security
uses
Using LPR for law enforcement purposes other than traffic
enforcement (e.g. criminal investigations or surveillance)
Using LPR to enforce toll, parking, and other traffic regulations

Commercial Vehicle
Screening
Tolling and Payment

Using LPR for monitoring and screening commercial vehicles, or
enforcing freight-regulated regulations
Using LPR to collect payment for tolling or other purposes

Travel Time Estimates

Using LPR to estimate travel times between two points

Travel Behavior
Analysis
Does not specify

Using LPR to analyze individual’s travel behavior

Law Enforcement

Either does not specify uses of LPR, or the language is vague

If a law addressed one of these areas in Table 4, the team recorded an “X” in the
appropriate column in Table 5 on the following page. Laws could address multiple use cases, and
frequently did.

Table 5. State Laws Addressing Privacy Concerns from LPR Use
Year

2013

2015

2015

2014

2014

State

AR

AR

CA

CO

HB
1996/Act
1491

HB
1744/Act
849

S.B.
34

HB
1152

Legislative Information

2010

2014

2015

2014

2015

2014

2013

2014

2013

FL

ME

MD

MN

NH

NC

TN

UT

UT

VT

SB
226

§2117A

SB
699

SB
86

Sec
236:130

SB
182

SB
1664

SB
196

SB
51/222

Ch. 15
Sec.
1607/8

LPR Use Case
Travel Time Estimates

X

Travel Behavior Analysis

X

Does Not Specify

X

X
X

X

Tolling & Payment

X

Commercial Vehicle Screening
Access & Parking

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Traffic Enforcement
Law Enforcement

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

Legal Requirement
Requires LPR Training

X

Requires Security Breach Notification

X

Designates LPR Data as PII, Sensitive, etc.

X

X

X

Restricts Linkages to External Databases

X

Audits LPR Use

X

X

X
X

Establishes Use Policy

X

X

X

X

X

Requires LPR Use or Data Request Records

X

X

X

X

X

Restricts LPR Use

X

X

X

Restricts Data Use

X

X

X

Requires Data Destruction

X

X

X

Restricts Data Sharing or Access

X

X

X

Source: NCSL, 2015

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Law enforcement was the single most frequently cited use case for privacy controls, with
13 of the 14 measures addressing law enforcement in some form or another (see Figure 14). In
fact, five of the pieces of legislation focus exclusively on law enforcement uses of LPR.
14

13

Frequency of Occurrence

12
10
8
6

5

5

4
4

3
2

2

2

1

0

Figure 14. Frequency of Occurrence of LPR Use Cases Addressed in Legislation
The next most frequently cited use cases were the Access and Parking and Traffic
Enforcement use cases, with each item included in five laws. Three laws fell under the Does Not
Specify category, which meant that the law either did not provide specific areas to which it
applied or the legislative language was sufficiently broad that it could apply to other uses beyond
those specified. For example, Maine’s law specifically points to some uses that it says are
acceptable, but also uses broad language in one section that could authorize other uses.
Legal Requirements
The laws not only apply to a variety of different use cases, but also impose a variety of
different requirements on these uses. The research team reviewed and analyzed the laws to
identify different requirements, and recorded these requirements in Table 6 with an “X” in the
appropriate category. Categories were developed by reviewing the laws and identifying
requirements that frequently reoccur. The legal requirements categories are defined in Table 6.
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Table 6. LPR Legal Requirement Descriptions
Legal Requirement

Description

Establishing Use Policy

Requires the entity using the LPR system develop a written policy
guiding the entity’s LPR activities and uses

Requiring Data Destruction

Requires data from LPR system be destroyed after a certain time period

Restricting Data Sharing or
Access

Restricts who may access data, who it may be shared with, how it may
be shared, etc.

Restricting Data Use

Restricts who may use data, how it may be used, etc.

Restricting LPR Use

Restricts who may use LPRs, how LPRs may be used, etc.

Requiring LPR Use or Data
Request Records

Requires entities using LPR systems to develop, update, and provide
information on use

Auditing LPR Use

Requires regular reporting or auditing of LPR use data

Designating LPR Data as PII
or sensitive
Restricting Linkages to
External Databases

Designates LPR data as PII, sensitive information, confidential
information, or similar legal category with special legal protections

Requiring LPR Training

Requires entities using LPR systems undergo training on their use

Requiring Notification of
Security Breaches

Requires notification to the public or affected individuals if a security
breach of the LPR system occurs

Restricts linking LPR data to other databases

Several categories of requirements seek to improve oversight and create accountability
for those using LPR systems. For example, a written use policy requires public agencies to
develop a publicly available document detailing how, why, and/or when LPR systems will or
will not be used, along with many other possible details. This forces agency leaders to consider
the programs they are administering and write public policies guiding their use, which may result
in leaders being held accountable if their agency fails to follow the written use policy. Similarly,
requiring agencies to maintain records on how or when LPR systems are used, and then having a
third party audit these records could also improve accountability.
Some other requirements focus more on the actual operation of LPR systems. For
example, some states restrict who can or cannot use LPR systems (e.g., law enforcement can or
cannot use LPR), or create requirements on when or how they can or cannot be used (e.g., traffic
analysis is acceptable, but surveillance is not). Maine’s legislation prohibits general use of ALPR
systems, but exempts several specific groups and purposes: the Maine Department of
Transportation can use LPRs to protect public safety and transportation infrastructure, and the
Department of Public Safety and Bureau of State Police are granted permission for inspecting
and screening commercial motor vehicles (Gierlack et al., 2014). Vermont’s policy requires
operators undergo special training before they can use LPR systems. California requires any
entity operating an LPR system, “maintain reasonable security procedures and practices… to
protect ALPR information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or
disclosure” (California 2015). There was substantial variation in the activities states specifically
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banned or allowed, and it often seemed tied to regional concerns or issues. New Hampshire, for
example, lists specific exits on a transit facility where LPR use is lawful.
Some of the most frequently occurring requirements focus on protecting or restricting the
use of data acquired through LPRs (see Figure 15). Almost all of the laws either require the data
from LPR be destroyed after a set amount of time, place restrictions on sharing the data, or
restrict who may use the data and how it may be used. In SB 34, for example, California restricts
data sharing by stating, “A public agency shall not sell, share, or transfer LPR information,
except to another public agency, and only as otherwise permitted by law.” Florida also restricts
sharing, but through a different mechanism. Florida designates any PII found in LPR systems as
“confidential,” and makes this personal data no longer subject to open records requests.

12
11

Frequency of Occurrence

10

10

6
5
3

3

2
1

1

Figure 15. Frequency of Occurrence of ALPR Legal Requirements
Data destruction requirements also varied widely by states (see Table 7). Arkansas
requires in HB 1996, for example, that any “Captured plate data obtained… shall not be
preserved for more than 150 days.” States often had some legal exceptions, however, when data
might be held for longer periods. In this case, Arkansas allows that data “may be retained as part
of an ongoing investigation,” but requires that it be destroyed once the investigation or any
criminal legal actions has completed.
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Table 7. Data Destruction Requirements by State
State
Utah
Maine
California
Minnesota
Tennessee
Arkansas
North Carolina
New Hampshire
Vermont
Colorado

Number of Days
14
21
60
60
90
150
365
548
548
1,095

When states designate LPR data as PII, sensitive, or confidential, they often bestow a
variety of different protections. Florida, as mentioned earlier, designates LPR data as
confidential and makes it no longer subject to open records requests. Maine also makes LPR data
confidential, which removes it from open records requests. In the event of a California public
agency having a breach of personal information (which LPR data is considered) an agency must
notify individuals in “the most expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay.” In a
somewhat unusual policy, Arkansas bans “captured plate data” from containing any personal
data. Arkansas also specifically defines captured plate data as “the GPS device coordinates, date
and time, photograph, license plate number, and any other data captured by or derived from any
automatic license plate reader system.” Some state and federal laws allow individuals to sue in
court for privacy violations, including classes of individuals, and these can also result in
significant fines or damages awards.
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LPR AND PRIVACY
The judicial analysis and review discusses laws regulating privacy. These laws originate
from several sources, each listed below with a brief notation as to that law’s likely applicability
to LPRs. Generally these laws pertain specifically to law enforcement agency use; LPR use by
transportation agencies has not been raised.
United States Constitution
Article III of the Constitution imposes justiciability2 requirements that limit federal
courts’ ability to hear claims. In particular, “standing” requires that plaintiffs allege an actual
injury and not merely raise abstract objections to laws or policies from which plaintiffs
themselves have not suffered. Justiciability requirements will either limit or eliminate claims
brought against the use of LPRs by people who cannot show an actual injury. State courts have
similar requirements, but are not viewed as strictly as federal courts.

2

“Justiciable” means suitable for litigation, a concept which has special meaning in federal courts. To be justiciable,
a legal claim must be “ripe” (actual and existing, not speculative), the plaintiff must have “standing” (have suffered
an actual injury caused by defendant’s conduct, and capable of resolution by a court), and the claim must not
become “moot” (must remain ripe through the entirety of litigation). See Wright & Kane, Federal Courts 7th ed.
(West) 133-42.
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The First Amendment both supports and undermines privacy rights. The support comes
from Supreme Court rulings (and some dissents) describing the First Amendment’s protection of
intellectual freedom. This freedom includes such things as free association, the right to refuse
disclosure of one’s membership in associations, and even the right to refuse disclosure of one’s
beliefs.
The First Amendment’s conflict with privacy occurs with its protection of expression,
such as when a news organization publishes illegally-obtained information. In these instances,
the LPR data holder who negligently released information may have liability, not from the First
Amendment itself (which merely protected the publication), but from other laws explained
below, most notably the Fourth Amendment and certain statutes. We discuss the Fourth
Amendment after briefly addressing the Fifth and Fourteenth because it has long been considered
the most critical in protecting privacy from government intrusion.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ due process clauses create limited privacy
rights regarding family, health, procreation, and sex. There is no indication in current litigation
that these principles will extend to the use of LPRs. The Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination
clause also protects privacy interests, but is expressly limited to criminal prosecutions and should
not otherwise apply to LPR data.
The Fourth Amendment provides citizens reasonable expectations of privacy from
warrantless searches or seizures by government entities, at both the state and federal level. This
has traditionally been viewed as a limit on law enforcement operations, but in the past few years
has been applied in purely civil cases. To be viewed as violating the Fourth Amendment
protection, a state or federal entity must:
1. Engage in a search or seizure of a person or that person’s property,
2. Without a warrant (or under none of the warrantless exceptions), and
3. In a setting where the person would have a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”
A critical question is whether use of LPR constitutes a “search.” There have been no
Fourth Amendment cases directly related to LPR. In 1983, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment in United States v. Knotts held that there was no expectation of privacy
regarding the location of any particular vehicle on public roadways (Eberline, 2008; Hermann,
2015). The case involved a radio transmitter that was installed to aid tracking suspected illegal
drug manufacturers. More recently, in United States v. Jones, the Court addressed whether a
Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking device attached to a car constituted a search. The
Court’s decision was split. However, the majority opinion held that the use of a GPS and the
warrantless collection of location data over an extended period of time did constitute a search
(Gierlack et al, 2014). The “mosaic theory” – a civil liberties theory of Fourth Amendment
privacy law – posits, however, that when many individual ALPR readings of a single vehicle are
combined to analyze the vehicle’s movements over time, they constitute an invasion of privacy,
even though each individual reading would not (Gutierrez-Alm, 2015).
It is difficult to predict exactly how the Court would resolve Fourth Amendment issues
raised by LPRs. Fourth Amendment litigation regarding large-scale collection and analysis of
LPR data had not, as of 2014, reached the U.S. Supreme Court, but lower courts have heard
some cases (Merola and Lum, 2012; Gierlack et al, 2014). However, the legal expertise on the
research team believes the Fourth Amendment will be the basis for lawsuits against LPR usage.

37

The lawsuit likely would be brought as a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.3 The ACLU
has been active in seeking information on the extent of LPR use. Generally, this has involved
filing federal Freedom of Information Act requests (or their state law analogs) and litigating any
denials (Gierlack et al., 2014). These suits have sought to gather information on the amount and
scope of data collected, rather than any direct effort to halt LPR use.
Federal Statutes
Congress has enacted a number of statutes protecting privacy in general and PII in
particular. It is likely, but not certain, that federal statutes would govern only federal LPR data
holders. At this point, the legal expert on the research team is not aware of any federal statutes
directed specifically to LPRs or data obtained by them. However, the LPR function falls under
at least one other general statute, the Privacy Act of 1974, which prevents the unauthorized
disclosure of personal information held by the federal government. The statute’s language is
broad and would appear to include LPR information obtained or held by any federal agency or
office, although there has not been any application of the Privacy Act of 1974 to LPRs.
LPRs may also fall under other general statutes protecting privacy. For example, the
Federal Driver Privacy Protection Act of 1994 provides that, “A State department of motor
vehicles, and any officer, employee, or contractor thereof, shall not knowingly disclose or
otherwise make available to any person or entity . . .” certain PII obtained by that DMV.4 When
government entities using LPRs have access to, or later obtain DMV information, this statute
would apply.
When LPR use includes access to financial information (as with toll authorities), other
federal statutes protecting financial information may apply. Most of these statutes are sufficiently
narrow to specify their intended coverage, and do not allow use outside the statute’s meaning, as
with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act’s focus on financial institutions.5 On the other hand, plaintiffs
with LPR complaints may attempt claims under a broad reading of these statutes, and in some
instances the broad reading may succeed.
Privacy regulation in general ranges from none to considerable (the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act for example), and even where the laws exist, enforcement
3

In 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Congress authorized private persons to bring legal claims in federal or state court against any
state actor who acts under state law to violate the claimant’s civil rights. The statute defines civil rights as “any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” Acting under state law means acting “under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,” and includes both actions authorized by state law and
misuse of authority. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961). The covered civil rights include privacy under
the Fourth Amendment. See Soldal v. Cook, 506 U.S. 56 (1992) (not an informational privacy case, but holding that
a police-assisted seizure of a mobile home for eviction purposes raised a Fourth Amendment claim, and was a
proper § 1983 claim against both the police and the landlord). For an argument on the application to ALPRs, see
Jessica Gutierrez-Alm, The Privacies of Life: Automatic License Plate Recognition is Unconstitutional Under the
Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment Privacy Law, 38 Hamline L. Rev. 127 (2015); ACLU, You Are Being
Tracked: How License Plate Readers Are Being Used to Record Americans’ Movements, 2 (July 2013) available at
https://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/you-are-being-tracked-how-license-plate-readers-are-being-used-record.
4 See 18 U.S.C. § 2721.
5
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (1999). The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (1999) imposed
privacy-safeguard requirements on “financial institutions” which it defines as “any institution the business of which
is engaging in financial activities as described in section 1843(k) of title 12” (which further defines “activities that
are financial in nature.”) Thus the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act defines the statute’s focus, and though broadly
including financial institutions, by its text excludes other entities holding private data.
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varies considerably. Any federal statutes that do apply to LPR functions will often have penalties
that may include fines (civil or criminal), other criminal penalties, or a private cause of action
authorizing an injured party to sue the agency or people within the agency. For example, the
Privacy Act specifically provides civil remedies, including damages, and criminal penalties, for
violations.
An individual claiming such a violation by an agency may bring civil action in a federal
district court. If the individual substantially prevails, the court may assess reasonable attorney
fees and other litigation costs against the agency. In addition, the court may direct the agency to
grant the plaintiff access to his/her records, and when appropriate direct the agency to amend or
correct its records subject to the Act. Actual damages may be awarded to the plaintiff for
intentional or willful refusal by the agency to comply with the Act. In the case of “criminal
violations” of the Act, an officer or employee of an agency may be fined up to $5,000 for:


Knowingly and willfully disclosing individually identifiable information which is
prohibited from such disclosure by the Act or by agency regulations; or



Willfully maintaining a system of records without having published a notice in the
Federal Register of the existence of that system of records.

In addition, an individual may be fined up to $5,000 for knowingly and willfully
requesting or gaining access to a record about an individual under false pretenses.
Because the use of LPRs is legal in all states, although with significant restrictions in
some, it is unlikely that any public users of such systems would face civil liability as described
above. Even if a litigant could identify a legal theory to support a lawsuit, the doctrines of
sovereign and qualified immunity6 would pose additional obstacles to a successful suit, at least
under current law in most states (Gierlack, et al., 2014). Some federal and state statutes include
an underlying regulatory structure that would have to be considered as noted below.
Common Law Privacy Torts
American common law recognizes four tort claims regarding privacy: (1) invasion of
privacy or the unreasonable intrusion on seclusion, (2) appropriation of name or likeness, (3)
public disclosure of private facts, and (4) holding someone out in a false light. Government
entities (state or federal) should be immune from suit under these four common law theories
unless the applicable Tort Claims Act (1) specifically waives immunity for that tort, or (2) is read

6

Sovereign immunity is an ancient doctrine which in its absolute form bars legal claims against governments and
government employees. Both the United States and the individual states have inherent sovereign immunity from
lawsuits unless (1) the government entity waives immunity in what are typically called “tort claims acts,” or (2) in
the case of states, Congress abrogates (overrides) state immunity as it did in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for civil rights
violations. In spite of Congress overriding state immunity in § 1983, some parties retain absolute immunity. Judges
acting in their judicial capacity are one example. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-554 (1967). Similarly,
police and certain other government actors have qualified immunity from § 1983 claims, that is, they are not liable if
they had a good faith belief that their actions were lawful or justified. In these two examples, the judge is immune
from liability without the need to prove anything further while the police officer is immune only if he or she can
show the action was done in a good faith belief of its legality.
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to cover the tort under a broad negligence waiver.7 Non-governmental entities using LPRs will
be subject to these tort claims.
Contract Law
Where data collectors have a contract with the people from whom data is gathered, the
contract may impose privacy obligations on the collector, or alternatively may include waivers in
which the subject of data collection agrees that certain information can be collected, aggregated,
assessed, and/or transferred to other parties. To the extent that LPRs are used by government
entities, there are likely no contractual issues to consider.
Professional and Fiduciary Obligations
Professionals such as doctors and lawyers and fiduciaries such as estate trustees have
legal and ethical obligations that generally include protecting privacy interests, even in the
absence of requirements under statute, regulation, or contract. As with contractually-imposed
limits, it is unlikely that government-operated LPRs will have professional or fiduciary
obligations to the owners of vehicles who have been subject to LPR data collection.
PUBLIC OPINION REVIEW OF LPR AND PRIVACY
Public transportation agencies use LPR data to aid in transportation planning, traffic
monitoring, and traffic enforcement. Agencies use the data to assist the public in making better
travel choices or in efficiently paying for transportation services and facilities. However, privacy
advocates view the implementation of LPR technology as a serious privacy and civil liberties
threat, especially when data are stored, retained, and shared (ACLU, 2013). While the actual
privacy risks of different transportation uses of LPR data as examined in this report are often
quite low, sometimes it is the perceptions of privacy risk that affects people’s acceptance of the
various LPR applications. There may be very low privacy risk for some LPR applications, but if
people perceive a risk and raise concerns to policy makers or other decision makers – it may
compromise agencies’ ability to collect and use LPR data in the future.
Public attitudes about the privacy risks of LPR technology have not been tracked over
time. However, public attitudes about privacy – in general – have been tracked over time, and
these data can inform the current study. Gauging public sentiment about privacy risks is a
complicated topic. This is because the value of privacy and consumer interest in protecting
privacy are complex and ever-changing ideas: varying over time, from person to person, in
different contexts and transactions, and in response to current events. As an example, a recent

7

Some states’ tort claims acts waive sovereign immunity for narrowly-defined and itemized claims. The Texas Tort
Claims Act, for example, waives immunity for negligence by a state employee acting within the scope of
employment who is involved in an auto accident (or with motor-driven equipment), or creates injury by misusing
tangible property. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.021. In contrast, the Federal Tort Claims Act provides a
broad waiver for “claims against the United States . . . caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment under circumstances where
the United States, if a private person, would be liable. . . ”28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). The waiver is re-stated, arguably
more broadly, in a resulted statute providing for federal government liability “in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private individual under like circumstances . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2674. This broad nonspecific waiver is then
followed by exceptions to waiver stated in 28 U.S.C. § 2680. Using this broad initial waiver followed by exceptions
will likely require amendments to the statutory exceptions unless the government entity wishes to waive immunity
for claims arising under new technology.
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Pew Research Center Survey (2015) found that aside from social security numbers (SSN), which
95 percent of respondents considered to be sensitive information, data ranging from health
information, phone and email message content, to one’s romantic relationship history could all
be viewed as sensitive depending on the context (see Figure 16). Of particular importance for our
purposes, one’s physical location over time was second to SSN in terms of perceived sensitivity
– a key data element derived from LPR data.
Social security Number
Physical location over time
Health information
Content of phone conversations
Content of email message
Content of text messages
Phone numbers called or texted
Relationship history
Websites visited
Information on friends
Birth date
Searches via search engines
Political views
Religious and spiritual views
Basic purchasing habits
Media you like
0
Sensitive

20

40

60

80

100

Not Sensitive

Figure 16. Public Perceptions of Privacy and Security in the Post-Snowden Era, Pew
Research Center, November 12, 2014
Levels of Privacy Concern
Westin defined privacy as the “claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine
for themselves, when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to
others” (Westin, 2003). He measured and tracked public sentiment regarding privacy in more
than 30 privacy related surveys between 1978 and 2004. Through this work, Westin "segmented"
the American public into three categories based on their reported levels of privacy concern
(Kumaraguru and Cranor, 2005):
 The Privacy Fundamentalists: This group views privacy as an especially high value,
rejects the claims of many organizations to need or be entitled to get personal information
for their business or governmental programs, thinks more individuals should simply
refuse to give out information they are asked for, and favors enactment of strong federal
and state laws to secure privacy rights and control organizational discretion. This group
generally chooses privacy controls over consumer-service benefits whenever these
compete with each other.
 The Pragmatists: This group weighs the individual and societal benefits of various
consumer products and services, the enforcement of public safety, and protection of
national security against the degree of intrusiveness of the personal information collected.
They believe that businesses and government should “earn” their trust before they accept
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privacy risks. Where consumer matters are involved, they want the opportunity to decide
whether to opt-in or opt- out of collection and use of their personal information.
 The Unconcerned: This group is generally trustful of organizations collecting their
personal information, comfortable with existing organizational procedures and uses, is
willing to forego privacy claims to secure consumer-service benefits, and does not in
favor new privacy laws or regulations.
Temporal trends from the 1970s to early 2000s show that the distributions in the three
categories vary over time, but in general, the percentages hover around 15–25 percent
fundamentalists, 15–25 percent unconcerned, and 40–60 percent pragmatists (Westin, 2001).
As is often the case when characterizing public opinion, there is often a small group of
concerned citizens, such as the fundamentalists who often can influence public policy on a topic.
As an example, privacy fundamentalists have vocally expressed their views in many states,
which led to the near elimination of LPR use for origin-destination surveys by many MPOs and
state DOTs (Hard, et al, 2006). At the other side of the issue, the “unconcerned” represent a
small group whose behavior also sways public policy on the topic by their lack of bother about
protecting privacy. These two groups are in contrast to the privacy pragmatists who would still
respond to external station surveys – weighing for themselves the personal and societal value and
the relevance of the information collection activity against any perceived costs and risks. In
recent years, as discussed below, the share of concerned individuals appears to be increasing.
Privacy Paradox
The large number of pragmatists has led to the observation that many individuals display
paradoxical behavior when it comes to privacy – that people express concerns about privacy and
the capture of information in some contexts, but do not act accordingly in terms of the ways in
which they may or may not safeguard their information (Acquisti & Gross, 2006; Boyd &
Hargittai, 2010; Debatin et al., 2009). For example in a 2014 Pew Research Center survey,
people say they are concerned about privacy on the web and their cellphones. They say they do
not trust Internet companies or the government to protect it. Yet they keep using the services and
handing over their personal information (Madden, 2014). The phenomenon where people’s
privacy concerns do not seem to affect their behavior has come to be called the privacy paradox
(Barnes, 2006). Hence, the privacy paradox describes a discrepancy between attitudes and
behavior. So far, however, this paradox has not been fully explained. Underlying factors have
been identified as a lack of risk awareness, a lack of awareness of possible tools to protect
privacy, and a tendency to underestimate the privacy dangers of self-disclosure.
But more recently, privacy as a public policy and societal issue has become linked with
notions of security and surveillance, and the potential link between attitudes and behavior has
strengthened. The Pew Research Center (2015) examined American’s thoughts about privacy, as
indicated in the word cloud presented in Figure 17. People associated privacy with ideas of
personal information—private, confidential. Beyond the frequency of individual words, when
Pew grouped the answers into themes, the largest block of answers ties to concepts of security,
safety, and protection. As the links among privacy, security, and surveillance become more
established, people start to alter their behavior as noted below.
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What comes to mind when you hear the word “privacy”?

Figure 17. Public Perceptions of Privacy and Security in the Post-Snowden Era, Pew
Research Center, November 12, 2014
Changing Public Opinion and Shifting Behavior
Public opinion regarding privacy and security seem sensitive to the context of current
events: terror threats, cyberattacks, and revelations regarding governmental surveillance all seem
to affect American’s views. Terrorist attacks have generated increased anxieties, for example.
After the San Bernardino and Paris shootings in late 2015, a Pew Research Center survey found
that 56 percent of Americans were more concerned that the government’s anti-terror policies
have not gone far enough to protect the country, compared with 28 percent who expressed
concern that the policies have gone too far in restricting the average person’s civil liberties
(Rainie and Madden, 2016). Just two years earlier, after Edward Snowden’s revelations about
National Security Agency surveillance programs, a plurality said they were more concerned that
anti-terror programs had gone too far in restricting civil liberties (47 percent), rather than not far
enough in protecting the country (35 percent).
Simultaneously, other findings suggest Americans are becoming more anxious about
their privacy, especially in response to growing numbers of security breaches. Globally, 1 billion
data records were compromised in 2014 (Frank, 2016). In a PricewaterhouseCoopers survey on
cyber threats, 76 percent of corporate executives said they were more concerned about cyber
threats than in the previous 12 months, and 79 percent had detected a security breach in the past
year.
Perhaps in response to such events and issues, several studies have captured changing
attitudes relating to privacy. A 2014/2015 survey by Pew Research Center found that postSnowden, 17 percent of respondents had changed their privacy settings on social media; 15
percent use social media less often; 15 percent have avoided certain apps and 13 percent have
uninstalled apps (Rainie and Madden, 2015). More recently, a 2015 study by the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration found that nearly half of Internet users in
the U.S. refrained from online activities due to privacy and security concerns (Goldberg, 2016).
Forty-five percent of online households reported that these concerns stopped them from
conducting financial transactions, buying goods or services, posting on social networks, or
expressing opinions on controversial or political issues via the internet, and 30 percent refrained
from at least two of these activities. Identity theft was the top reason for refraining from online
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activities – cited by 63 percent of respondents – followed by financial fraud, noted by 45 percent.
Nineteen percent of internet-using households—representing nearly 19 million households—
reported that they were affected by an online security breach, identity theft, or similar malicious
activity during the 12 months prior to the survey. Similarly, 22 percent of internet-using
households that used a mobile data plan to go online outside the home experienced an online
security breach. These figures all reinforce the growth of concerns regarding data privacy and
security in recent years.
Implications for LPR Data Collection
In the U.S., there remains a tension expressed in public opinion about the desire for more
or less government intervention in privacy protection. Privacy protection in the U.S. is granted
not by a single national law regulating privacy, as in Europe, but by a patchwork of federal and
state laws and regulations. The U.S. has taken a passive stance on privacy legislation, leaving
companies to self-regulate privacy practices.
As the agency responsible for privacy protection, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
issued best practices in 2012 to protect privacy and give Americans greater control over the
collection and use of their personal data. The FTC goal was to balance the privacy interests of
consumers with innovation that relies on information to develop beneficial new products and
services (FTC, 2012). Only when firms fail at self-regulation does the FTC step in. The practices
focus on four key concepts:
 Notice of collection and intended use (purpose limitation)
 Informed consent
 Citizen access to information about themselves
 Responsibility to keep data secure and accurate
In an LPR context, these practices are often challenging to uphold because data linked to
a person are often:
 Not provided by a subject
 Results from opportunistic sensing system (that is one in which an individual may not
know his/her movements are being captured)
 Identified ex-post from the integration of LPR data with other data.
LPR is a “sensing” technology that the public may view as a means of surveillance
(ACLU, 2013). Thus, the public may become increasingly concerned about its use in law
enforcement and perhaps, by transportation agencies. As such, Americans’ views about privacy
and surveillance are relevant to transportation agencies forming policies on these matters.
According to 2015 surveys by the Pew Research Center, a majority of Americans believe
it is important – often “very important” – that they be able to maintain privacy and
confidentiality in commonplace activities of their lives (Madden and Rainie, 2015). Most
strikingly, these views are especially pronounced when it comes to knowing what information
about them is being collected and who is collecting it. These feelings also extend to a desire to
maintain privacy when moving around in public. Survey results from early 2015 show:
 93 percent of adults say that being in control of who can get information about them is
important; 74 percent feel this is “very important,” while 19 percent say it is “somewhat
important.”
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90 percent say that controlling what information is collected about them is important—65
percent think it is “very important” and 25 percent say it is “somewhat important.”
88 percent say it is important that they not have someone watch or listen to them without
their permission; 67 percent feel this is “very important” and 20 percent say it is
“somewhat important.”
63 percent feel it is important to be able to “go around in public without always being
identified.” Only 34 percent believe being able to go unnoticed in public is “very
important” and 29 percent say it is “somewhat important” to them. In both cases, all
adults, regardless of age or gender, express comparable views.

In this current climate, trust that the collector of the information will keep data secure
becomes very important. But according the Pew Research Center surveys, Americans have little
confidence that their data will remain private and secure. Just 6 percent of adults say they are
“very confident” that government agencies can keep their records private and secure, while
another 25 percent say they are “somewhat confident.” This means that over 50 percent do not
feel confident that government agencies can keep their records safe and secure.
Out of broad concerns about the protection of personal information, a large portion of
respondents reported that they had engaged in some everyday obfuscation tactics and privacyenhancing measures. Some of the more common activities reported by Pew included:
 Refusing to provide information about themselves that was not relevant to a transaction
(57 percent have done this).
 Using a temporary username or email address (25 percent have done this).
 Giving inaccurate or misleading information about themselves (24 percent have done
this).
Transportation agencies need to be aware of the changing landscape of public opinion
and associated behaviors relating to privacy. LPR systems fall into a category of modern
information technologies (such as the internet and mobile phones) with the potential to magnify
individual uniqueness, thus, raising privacy challenges. At the same time, state regulation and
judicial decisions have fallen behind rapid progress in information technologies. Recent U.S.
Supreme Court decisions on individuals’ locational privacy have been conflicting or left key
questions unresolved. One of the most recent high court decisions indicated that “an individual
lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy on open, public roads”; another held that “warrantless
collection of location data over an extended period constitutes a search,” and, therefore, violates
a person’s expectation of privacy. The more LPR use is seen as general surveillance, the more
likely courts and the public may find it problematic. It is important to highlight, however, that
extensive LPR system use is legal in all states with varying levels of restrictions, and it is
unlikely that transportation agency users would face civil liability for their work with the
technology. However, public concerns might curtail its future application for transportation
purposes.
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CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDY SUMMARIES
Case studies were conducted to examine the similarities and differences in the application
of LPR to specific use case contexts. These case studies were based on the transportation use
cases identified in the privacy risk analysis presented in Chapter 2. By design, use cases were
selected to represent a range of low to high privacy risk, with an emphasis on higher-risk uses.
The five case studies were based on interviews with 25 subject matter experts and transportation
practitioners from state and local government agencies, supplemented by literature searches in
some cases. Literature review and a snowball sampling technique were used to identify agencies
that might employ LPR for the specific use, and email was used to contact individuals to serve as
expert interviews for case study data collection. Snowball sampling is used to identify hard-tolocate interview subjects, and functions as a chain referral: after finding someone with
knowledge on the specific use case, the researchers asked for assistance to help identify people
with similar knowledge and familiarity. Approximately five persons were interviewed for each
case study.
The full questionnaire is included in the appendix, but as a summary, the interview topics
included:
 For what purposes they use LPR,
 Associated benefits and challenges,
 Training practices regarding data use and control,
 Data retention and destruction practices,
 Data mining or data sharing practices,
 The existence of written data privacy policies or procedures.
The following subsections are organized according to the case studies: how LPR is used
in travel time estimation, access and parking, commercial vehicle screening, tolling and payment,
and travel behavior analysis.
TRAVEL TIME ESTIMATION
Travel time, or the time required to traverse a route between any two points of interest, is
a fundamental measure in transportation. The knowledge of travel times on road networks is of
vital importance for road operators as well as for passenger or commercial vehicle drivers.
Operators can use travel time information to improve control on their networks. Drivers can
choose their optimal route based on the available traffic information and their individual
preferences. LPR systems can be used to record the location of a vehicle at two different points
in time. Optical cameras capture images of license plates of oncoming or receding traffic and use
video image processing to "read" the license plates. License plate numbers can then be matched
at sensor locations downstream to generate travel speeds. These speeds can be averaged to
compute travel times for specific periods (e.g., peak versus non-peak) or for real-time use
through wireless communications. Several exploratory and pilot studies using LPR were
conducted in the late 1990s and early 2000s. However, the current literature search and
interviews with three state DOTs and two consultants reveal that LPR for travel time studies has
become a somewhat dated approach, supplanted by other technologies, such as Bluetooth, for
travel time estimation. The findings are summarized below. Since we could not locate any
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agencies using LPR systems for travel time estimation, not all topics are addressed in this case
study summary.
History and Current Context
In 1998, the FHWA’s Travel Time Handbook presented an overview of travel time data
collection methodologies to provide guidance to transportation professionals and practitioners in
the collection, reduction, and reporting of travel time data (Turner, et al., 1998). LPR was
identified as one of the primary strategies for travel time data collection. Other techniques
included “active” test vehicles (i.e., floating cars), passive ITS probe vehicles (i.e., cellular phone
tracking and GPS), and emerging and non-traditional techniques (i.e., aerial surveys, WIM
sensors, video).
In the mid-1990s, the United Kingdom Highways Agency, through its National Traffic
Control Center project, began using ALPR systems to collect vehicle flows and speeds every five
minutes, 24 hours a day, and seven days a week to provide real-time traffic information
(Dalgleish and Hoose, 2008). About this same time, U.S. agencies were also exploring the utility
of LPR for this purpose through field tests and pilot evaluations. While Great Britain’s use has
continued, the research team could not find any U.S. transportation agencies that are currently
relying on LPR for travel time estimation.
In the U.S., experience with LPR for travel time studies has mainly been in form of field
tests that evaluated the effectiveness of various travel time data collection methods side-by-side.
Volpe Center conducted field tests of several travel time data collection methods in 1993. LPR
was tested in Boston, Massachusetts; Seattle, Washington; and Lexington, Kentucky (Liu and
Haines, 1996). The ultimate goal was to develop a nationally uniform program of travel time data
collection and reporting in support of congestion management. The evaluation ended with the
conclusion that there was no best solution for capturing the desired information. The weaknesses
with LPR included problems with data collection and processing accuracy. In 1995, the
Volpe consultant was contracted by Washington State DOT to perform surveys of travel times
for two HOV corridors in Seattle (Woodson et al., 1995). It concluded that significant postprocessing efforts were needed to improve license plate matching results. In 2010, Seattle DOT
announced it was the first city in the nation to use LPR on city streets for travel time estimates.
By 2013, it had begun the process of replacing LPR with lower-cost Bluetooth readers.
In 1996, the Center for Urban Transportation Research demonstrated LPR use for the
collection of traffic data (including travel times) for the Hillsborough County congestion
management system in Florida. The evaluation determined that the method offered substantial
time savings, but that it had high equipment costs (Turner et al., 1998). In 2008, Florida DOT
conducted a small pilot of LPR use on I-10 in Tallahassee to generate travel time estimates. The
agency already owned the units being used for commercial vehicle enforcement. After the pilot,
LPR was never widely implemented for cost reasons. Now the agency uses location data from a
private sector data aggregation firm (i.e., HERE) and Bluetooth for travel time estimation. In
2000, Oregon DOT led the Frontier Travel Time Project, which was a demonstration project for
travel time and incident information on rural highways. LPR was selected as a test technology.
The study determined that LPR data could be used to present real-time travel time estimates to
drivers on the road (Bertini et al., 2005). However, recent communication with Oregon DOT
indicate that the agency does not use LPR for travel time estimation; only for enforcement
purposes at scale sites by the Motor Carrier Division.
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In 2004 and again in 2009, the Maryland State Highway Administration contracted with
the University of Maryland to assess LPR system reliability for use in travel time estimation. The
2004 study revealed that the LPR system under-performed – it produced a low match rate at a
high cost (Chang and Kang, 2005). The 2009 study found that overall performance of LPR
technology had improved over the years. While the research was positive, the Maryland State
Highway Administration never pursued LPR use for this purpose due to the departure of key
individuals.
Virginia DOT previously used LPR for travel time estimation, but now has a contract
with INRIX, a private-sector data aggregation firm, for crowdsourced data, and typically uses
this and other sources for travel time – not LPR.
Information about LPR System
Because ALPR systems require high-quality video with specific lighting and plate size
specification, there are high equipment costs, as well as extensive training and technical
knowledge requirements. Most agencies have not purchased equipment. In the pilots and
evaluations conducted, agencies preferred that vendors or consultants perform the video
collection and processing activities.
Data Storage and Retention
Since the research team could not locate any agencies using LPR systems for travel time
estimation, it was not possible to uncover any current information on data storage and retention
practices. However, the FHWA travel time data collection handbook advised that after license
plates have been matched and travel times computed, all records should be destroyed or deleted
to alleviate potential privacy issues (Turner et al., 1998). In the small pilot conducted by Florida
Department of Transportation (FDOT) in 2008, LPR data was destroyed once the travel time was
computed, immediately after a license plate passed the second reader. This practice also obviated
the necessity to comply with open records requests.
Technical Issues
Cost is a significant barrier to LPR use for travel time estimation, especially when
compared to newer technologies. For example, in order to instrument a four-lane arterial, a
minimum of eight sensors is needed (four at each corridor location, two in each direction).
Sensor prices, around 2010, averaged $10,000 each, resulting in an $80,000 price tag to cover a
four-lane arterial (Wang et al., 2011). In comparison, for example, Bluetooth sensors are much
less expensive and simpler to use. Each device equipped with Bluetooth traveling along a
roadway (e.g., smartphones, on-board receivers) uses a unique electronic identifier known as a
Media Access Control (MAC) address. These are anonymous, and not tied to a specific
individual. Bluetooth MAC addresses can be anonymously detected at multiple points by
Bluetooth readers, which are relatively easy to construct and customize. MAC addresses are
matched between each Bluetooth reader to estimate travel times.
Privacy Issues
The matching of license plate reads at two different locations and points in time does not
produce PII. However, an LPR does record license plate numbers, and potentially camera images
or video of vehicles, which could be used to identify vehicle owners by cross-referencing motor
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vehicle records. For this reason, for example, when conducting a small pilot, FDOT used only
the last 3 digits of the license plate and dropped the remaining characters and associated data.
Even so, depending on the implementation, drivers may be identified by video or camera images.
That said, researchers had no indication from the case study interviews that LPR was no longer
being used by agencies for travel time estimation because of privacy reasons. Instead, it was
supplanted by less-costly and easier-to-use sources of the information.
Summary of Travel Time Estimation Use Case
LPR performed comparatively well in evaluations over the past two decades. However,
interviews with consultants and state DOT staff indicated that though the LPR system
technology has improved in its collection and processing accuracy, it has been overtaken by
newer technologies, (e.g., Bluetooth, GPS in probe vehicles, data aggregators like HERE and
INRIX) that are thought to have significant cost and efficiency advantages. Privacy risks are
inherent in the use of LPR for travel time estimation because personal information about an
owner can be identified by matching a license plate against other databases. This risk did not
appear to be the primary reason that LPR has been supplanted by other information sources.
ACCESS CONTROL
LPR technology can be used to control, monetize and monitor access to ports, parking
facilities and other secured areas. LPR for access may be used in a facility that restricts,
monitors, or charges vehicles entering and exiting a parking lot. In one variation of access uses,
an LPR is mounted adjacent to an automatic barrier (e.g. gate, fence) at the entrance to a facility.
It reads an approaching vehicle license and matches it to a list of authorized vehicles. A correct
match will raise the barrier automatically. This system preempts the need for access card, RFIDs
or other devices to be issued to new drivers.
Parking enforcement can also occur through a mobile LPR camera checking the plates of
registered vehicle to determine if a vehicle is in violation. In this sort of use, for example, a
customer submits his or her vehicle’s license plate number to the enforcing agency, and
purchases parking credit associated with the plate (University of Kansas, 2016). An enforcement
officer then uses an LPR system, usually mounted on a vehicle, to scan license plates and check
to see if the vehicle either has permission to park, or if purchased credit associated with the plate
has elapsed. This sort of use is typically employed by a city, university, or other organization that
manages parking for a large number of vehicles.
As a final variation, organizations can use LPRs for passive data collection and
surveillance: monitoring vehicles that enter a controlled facility and checking plates against
terrorism, abduction, or other wanted person HOT lists to ensure a facility remains secure. Ports
or other security-oriented facilities are likely to employ LPRs for this sort of use.
The research team reached out to eight different organizations that seemed likely to use
LPR systems to control access to parking facilities, including ports and universities. Only two of
the organizations reported using LPR for access control, and most reported that they either did
not use the systems, or did not respond to interview requests. The results of these interviews are
summarized below.
History and Current Context
The use of LPR systems for parking enforcement dates to the mid-2000s, when in 2007,
the city of Calgary, Canada, implemented a parking enforcement system called ParkPlus
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(Calgary Parking Authority, 2016). System users input their license plate number when
registering and purchasing their parking, and mobile enforcement vehicles equipped with LPR
cameras automatically check the plates to determine if the associated vehicle has overstayed its
purchased time. The ParkPlus system has reduced the amount of work city employees must
perform by automating parts of the enforcement process. The innovative system, which is still in
use today, was so successful it received the 2009 Institute of Transportation Engineers Best
Practices award (Tannery Creek Systems, 2010). Since the mid-2000s, the popularity and use of
LPR systems for parking enforcement and control has increased steadily, with several major
cities and universities adopting them – although other parking methods, like magnetic strips and
RFID chips, are still commonly used.
To better understand the current uses of LPR systems for parking enforcement and access
control, the research team spoke with two organizations currently using the system: a port in a
major southern city, and a state university. The organizations used the LPR systems in very
different settings and manners, and as such, their challenges, benefits, and experiences were
relatively unique.
The port’s Chief of Police explained to researchers that they use the LPR system as a
layer of security for their facility: following the events of September 11, 2001, Congress passed
the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act), which created
several requirements designed to increase security at the nation’s ports. The port adopted the use
of LPRs as a means of monitoring access to their secured facility, and ensuring that high-risk
vehicles – those associated with terrorism watch lists, abduction cases, or wanted vehicles – are
identified. The port deployed the camera systems at three locations throughout the port: at both
main entrances to the port, and at the passenger pick-up/drop-off zone. Vehicles are scanned as
they enter the facility, and the scans are automatically checked against internally-stored HOT
lists to identify potential high-risk vehicles.
The university uses its LPR system in a somewhat-different manner, although several
characteristics of the use are the same. The university has two types of LPR systems: one set of
fixed cameras is located at the entrance and exit of a gate-operated parking facility. The cameras
scan vehicles as they enter and exit the facility; if a vehicle stays in the parking lot longer than
the time paid for, the LPR system notifies the parking system that a violation has occurred, and
an enforcement officer is dispatched to cite the vehicle.
The second system the university uses is mobile, mounted on transportation services
vehicles, and used to check for scofflaws or locally-wanted vehicles on campus. The
representative explained that if an individual has four or more parking violations with the
university on record, they are designated a scofflaw in an internal database, and the mobile LPR
unit checks license plates against it. If the LPR system identifies a scofflaw, the information is
sent to the transportation systems supervisor. In addition, the university receives HOT lists from
the local police department of wanted vehicles. The LPR database loads these vehicles into an
internal database, which the mobile system also checks against. If a locally-wanted vehicle is
identified on campus, the university notifies the local police department.
Information about LPR System
The port facility Chief of Police noted that they own three camera systems, and are in the
process of purchasing a replacement LPR system. He explained that they had some technical
challenges with the LPR systems, which are discussed in greater detail below. The port uses the
LPR system primarily for surveillance and security purposes. The port receives HOT lists
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containing the license plates associated with high-risk individuals, like terrorists or flight-risk
criminals. LPRs strategically placed at the port’s entrances, exits, and passenger pick-up/drop-off
areas scan license plates and check them against the HOT lists.
The university owns eight cameras across the fixed and mobile uses. Two cameras are
located at both the entrances and exits of the parking facility, for a total of four fixed cameras.
Four cameras are also equipped for the mobile use, with two cameras affixed to the front and
back of two vehicles. The university does not use LPR for its primary parking management
system, which relies on hang-tags with a magnetic stripe, but uses the fixed LPRs to control a
single parking facility and the mobile systems to apprehend chronic parking violators. At least
two major universities have recently converted their parking management systems to LPR-based
systems, including Texas Tech University and the University of Kansas, although neither of
these organizations participated in case study interviews for this report (Texas Tech University,
2016; University of Kansas, 2016).
Data Storage and Retention
The port reported that, as a policy, they store all photography data from all 200 cameras
at the port for 90 days. As new data accrues, the old data is automatically deleted from the
system. The Chief explained that if there was a security incident, investigators could come out
and view the data within 90 days.
The university reported that, per university policy, they store all LPR data for 30 days.
The respondent explained that the university policy, which was developed by a committee of
academics and community stakeholders, established a minimum storage time of 14 days and a
maximum of 30 days. They picked 30 days for business purposes: if a customer challenges a
violation, the transportation services would have a record to reference as evidence.
Data Security and Access
The Chief of Police at the port explained that the LPR data is deemed “security related,”
and as such, is subject to special protections. If personnel want access to the data, they must
request it through the chief. The data is stored in a secured environment at the port, which is
itself a highly-secured facility. The chief explained that no one is allowed unescorted access to
the port unless they have both the correct credentials and a specific documented purpose for
being there. He explained that none of the data is released to anyone outside the port, since the
data deals with the security of the port – such data is protected under state law.
The port adopted the LPR system in response to the Maritime Transportation Security
Act of 2002, and the SAFE Port Act of 2006, both of which created a variety of requirements
designed to increase the security of ports after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.
The university representative explained that their data is secured on a local server, and
access is managed through a secured, password-protected, log-in system. Only individuals with a
business need are granted access through their log-in credentials.
Sharing Data
The port made it clear that they do not share data with other organizations. As securityrelated data, state law prohibits it from being shared. They do not access the LPR systems of
other ports or agencies. When checking vehicles against law enforcement HOT lists, the port
downloads the data directly to their internal database, which does not require sharing data with
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law enforcement. The chief stated that in his seven-year tenure at the port, he had never had
another organization request their LPR data.
The university indicated that they share some data with the local police department in
limited situations. As explained above, the university receives HOT list data from the local
police department identifying the license plates of locally-wanted vehicles. If the university’s
mobile unit identifies a locally-wanted vehicle, they notify the local law enforcement to the
positive identification. In addition, if a hit-and-run situation occurs in the parking facility with
fixed LPRs, they can use the data to identify the offender, at which time they will send the data
to the local police department. They do not share actual video data unless law enforcement
specifically requests it. If the university’s on-campus law enforcement requests the data, they
will review the request, and share the data.
Technical Issues
The port reported that they had technical challenges with their existing camera system,
but were in the process of purchasing a new system that did not have such limitations. The chief
explained that the entrances to the ports have multiple lanes, but the current camera system did
not have a wide enough lens to capture the vehicles across all lanes. He also mentioned that their
camera system was set up to scan the front plate of vehicles, which can be problematic for
commercial freight vehicles: in commercial freight, the plate on the front of a tractor may not
correspond to the plate on the attached trailer. As a result of these issues, the port is in the
process of acquiring new LPR camera systems.
The university reported that the largest technical challenge they experienced with LPR
systems was the initial implementation. The representative stated that their situation and needs
were unique, and the vendor’s product did not meet their needs. As a result, they developed a
custom application to interface with the LPR system.
Privacy Issues
The port did not report any specific privacy challenges. This could be a result of the
relatively tight control over the data at the port. As discussed above, the port views LPR data as
security-related, and as such, no one can access the data without the chief of police’s permission.
They do not share data with other agencies, and any HOT lists are downloaded from external
sources and stored internally.
The university reported that they have received questions about their LPR system, but the
interviewee did not feel these rose to the level of a challenge. They had curious individuals
inquire about the cameras and their use, but no individuals have objected to the system. The
university trains its staff on a regular basis about data security and privacy issues through online
courses with quizzes to ensure retention of key elements. The university also formed an
interdisciplinary committee to review audio and visual surveillance practices across campus, and
the committee created policies and standards governing such practices.
Awareness and knowledge of applicable laws and regulations
The port interviewee seemed knowledgeable about state and federal laws governing
security and data at the port. Throughout the interview, he referenced several state and federal
laws that had influenced their use, including the SAFE Ports Act, and the Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002, both of which address surveillance and security at the
nation’s ports.
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Laws and regulations were not mentioned in the discussion with the university. The
university representative mostly focused on internal policies, and ensuring its system was in
compliance with these rules and regulations.
Neither the port nor the university transportation services reported spending a significant
number of man hours to addressing privacy issues. When asked about the occurrence of privacy
issues, both organizations reported few, if any, issues. The lack of public concern or privacy
issues may be a factor in the limited deployment of resources.
The university established an oversight committee, separate from the transportation
department, to oversee and review audio and visual surveillance activities across the university.
The committee developed a policy governing audio visual surveillance, and reviews any requests
to install such equipment.
Internal Policies
The port mentioned that they severely restrict data access; any individuals who wish to
access the data must go through the port’s chief of police.
The university representative emphasized that their use of LPR systems is consistent with
a university policy governing the use of audio video surveillance technology (AVST). The policy
was developed by a committee of academics and community stakeholders, and establishes
“standards for installation, relocation, and use of approved AVST equipment and the
circumstances in which recorded material may be reviewed or released.” The committee
responsible for creating the regulations also serves as an oversight body, and is charged with
reviewing and approving any audio/visual surveillance.
Conclusion
Some transportation agencies currently use LPR technology to control and secure access
to a facility, although there are other technologies commonly used like RFID or magnetic stripe
cards. The uses, experiences, and challenges interviewees discussed all varied, although none
reported significant privacy issues.
As an especially security-conscious organization, the port uses the LPR system primarily
as a tool to increase security at the port. The LPRs monitor access to the port, and alert staff if a
high-risk vehicle enters the facility. The port follows an internal policy and destroys data after 90
days, and does not share their data with law enforcement agencies. The port reported some
technical challenges regarding their cameras failing to provide sufficient coverage, although they
did not struggle with privacy issues.
The university transportation department uses LPRs to monitor and monetize access to a
parking facility, and for mobile surveillance on campus. The university follows a detailed policy
regarding audio and video surveillance on campus, which establishes standards requiring
training, designates how surveillance equipment and related data can be used, determines when
data can be shared or when it must be destroyed, among other provisions. The transportation
department often referenced the university policy, and the representative knew it requires the
data to be destroyed after 30 days. The only technical challenges reported had to do with
customizing the software to fit the agency’s needs.
COMMERCIAL VEHICLE SCREENING
LPR systems are used in many states for screening and inspection of commercial
vehicles, and the enforcement of related regulations. It is one of several technologies that are
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used to automate and increase the efficiency of commercial vehicle screening and the
enforcement of safety and other commercial vehicle regulations. Interviews with three state
DOTs and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) provided information on
commercial vehicle screening uses of LPR, benefits and challenges associated with LPR use, and
procedures and policies implemented that impact the privacy risk associated with the use of LPR
data.
History and Current Context
Commercial vehicles are required to comply with a number of regulations imposed by the
state in which they operate. Vehicles that operate in more than one state are also subject to
federal laws, most of which are overseen by FMCSA. State and federal regulations for
commercial vehicles include compliance with registration, safety, vehicle size, vehicle weight
and operational requirements. These regulations are designed to increase safety, monitor the
damage caused by heavy vehicles on roadways, and ensure that commercial vehicles comply
with applicable transportation regulations.
LPR technology can identify trucks by license plate number and match the vehicle to
existing state and federal motor carrier databases (some of which are public record) for
registration information, safety profiles or violations. LPRs are found in virtual weigh stations
and roadside enforcement systems designed to screen and inspect commercial vehicles for
compliance with safety and other regulatory requirements. Two DOTs reported using LPR
cameras on highway main lanes to screen passing commercial vehicles before they even enter a
weigh station. FMCSA reported that LPR are more commonly used at inspection stations and
weigh station ramps for sorting trucks.
The uses of LPR technology related to commercial vehicles include the following
specific purposes:


Vehicle Screening – Without LPR, vehicles may be screened manually by an enforcement
agent who reads the license plate and/or USDOT number and compares it to a
computerized database. The main benefit of LPR reported by one DOT is the ability to
automate this screening process. An alternative method for electronic screening would be
with a transponder system. Screening can be undertaken in roadway main lanes or as
commercial vehicles enter a weigh station ramp. Electronic screening leverages LPR to
identify a truck, link it to a database of motor carriers, and make an automated decision if
a person needs to review this truck - without manual intervention.



Regulatory and Safety Compliance – Commercial vehicles are screened for noncompliant permits, or expired registration, oversize and overweight violations, out-ofservice orders or other safety violations. One DOT also noted that they oversee regulations
related to the transportation of hazardous materials, such as expired hazmat placards.



Weight Enforcement – Traditional and virtual weigh stations are designed to allow
enforcement agencies to detect and sort passing trucks without requiring the vehicle to
stop. This allows for selective screening so that only non-compliant trucks or trucks with a
high possibility of being non-compliant are stopped for inspection. Compliant vehicles can
be allowed to bypass the inspection station. Another DOT noted that LPR helps the
agency understand and monitor the impact of trucks on the use and deterioration of state
roads. Estimates of truck travel are used to evaluate the use and deterioration of state
roads. Over-weight and over-size vehicle monitoring enables the DOT to verify their
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estimates of truck travel and to better plan for the impact commercial traffic has on the
roadways.
The main benefit of LPR is to automate and increase the efficiency of screening and
monitoring passing commercial vehicles. By automating the screening process and allowing
some trucks to bypass inspection stations, interviewees noted that these systems allow agencies
to focus resources on carriers that require more attention than others.
FMCSA assists states with improving and expanding regulatory compliance and
enforcement activities to “improve safety performance and remove high-risk carriers from the
Nation’s highways.” FMCSA provides research support, technical assistance and grant funding
(FMCSA 2014). The Commercial Vehicle Information Systems and Networks (CVISN) is a
FMCSA program to improve safety by helping states improve commercial vehicle safety,
improve efficiency of electronic screening and simplify enforcement operations (CVISN 2016).
CVISN grants are offered to states to deploy, operate and maintain information systems and
networks for the CVISN program, including LPR systems. According to CVISN program
documentation, several states obtained LPR systems through the CVISN federal grant programs
in 2013 and 2014 (FMCSA 2016).
The three state DOT interviewees all reported the use of LPR readers for commercial
vehicle activities. Commercial vehicle screening and compliance activities are sometimes
managed in partnership with, or entirely by, law enforcement agencies such as departments of
motor vehicles or departments of public safety. While the focus of this research is on
transportation uses, and not law enforcement, researchers recognize that these activities may
occur simultaneously. This is particularly true for commercial vehicle screening and compliance.
The use of LPR to track stolen vehicles, enforce speed limits, conduct criminal investigations
and other pure law enforcement operations are not included in this summary. Agencies
interviewed did not suggest that LPR devices for commercial vehicle screening are used for law
enforcement activities outside of commercial vehicle activity.
Information about LPR System
In a 2014 NCHRP study, LPR technology was identified as an innovative strategy for
gathering truck activity data (Zmud, Lawson, and Pisarski 2014). It can support agencies in
identifying commercial vehicles or companies with expired registration, out-of-service orders,
improper certifications, and oversize/overweight violations. It can also be used for speed
monitoring (Oliveira-Neto, Han, and Jeong. 2009).
All three state DOTs report that they own their LPR equipment. In one state, LPR
equipment is owned by the DOT, while a vendor provides maintenance and support. In a second
case, installation and training on using the equipment is provided by the vendor. One state
currently has three LPR units, and is constructing at least four more sites. In another state, 20 of
22 virtual weigh stations include LPR technology. In the remaining two, images are still taken of
the vehicles, but they do not use optical recognition software to read the license plates.
In weigh stations and enforcement systems, LPR is often combined with other
technologies such as USDOT number readers, WIM devices, detection loops, video imaging to
detect over-size vehicles and even magnetometer sensors.
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Data Storage and Retention
Commercial vehicle LPR data may include or be linked to the following data:
 License plate numbers and photo
 Date, time and location
 USDOT registration number
 Registration, compliance and
 Truck size, weight and other defining features
 Photo of vehicle and/or surroundings
Commercial vehicle LPR data may be linked to USDOT registration information and
local freight databases. In one state, an overhead photo of the truck, photos of license plate, OCR
result, confidence interval of OCR result, and photo of USDOT numbers are packaged together
under a unique ID. This is then linked to the truck weight, length, axles, axle weights, axle
spacing as well as a date and time stamp. The data file is given a tracking number and a flag for
weight violation. All the data are aggregated into a single transaction record and screened against
a local database for potential violations of the vehicle or the carrier.
One DOT reported that data is only collected on vehicles that meet certain criteria,
specifically Class 4 vehicles and above. No personal vehicles are tracked. The DOT launched a
public awareness campaign to inform the public that they were not looking at personal vehicles,
enforcement of speed limits, or even the drivers of commercial vehicles.
Data are stored according to the organization’s guidelines: no data on personal vehicles,
120 days for commercial vehicle images, and 3 years for vehicle information. They reported that
data are not used for general data mining or any other studies.
Data Security and Access
Agencies reported a range of policies to secure and manage LPR data. In no case was an
agency able to provide a written policy that dictated their LPR policy. Some states have
overarching privacy policies that provide guidance. A data retention period maximum was the
most common control used for LPR data.
One state’s commercial vehicle LPR databases are only accessible to staff in their
enforcement and compliance division. Access for these users is further controlled with user IDs
and password protection. This system of role-based security grants different levels of access
based on a set of five or six role types (e.g. administrative). This is defined in the agency-wide
user manual and data security standards.
Another state’s commercial vehicle LPR data is managed by and accessible to their
operations division. Operations staff must login with their employee number and password, and
when they do, access information is recorded.
Data Sharing
One DOT reported that it does not share data with other agencies or departments, but are
considering data sharing with other states for log-book verification: truck drivers log travel in
different states, which could be confirmed by LPR readings from other states. The DOT has also
received requests from other states to confirm whether a particular truck has passed through the
state. They provide this information, and outside staff do not receive access to the actual

57

database. Data are not currently shared with traffic or law enforcement agencies because the
cameras do not collect information on personal vehicles.
One DOT has a sharing agreement with partner agencies involved in commercial vehicle
enforcement across the state to share data. Partners include the city DOTs and port and bridge
authorities. Standard Commercial Vehicle Information Exchange Window data is shared, but
each organization collects its data independently. They also accept requests for data from other
vehicle enforcement agencies (only), for example for amber alerts.
Technical Issues
LPR systems do not reliably read all license plates. Interviewees suggested that LPRs
capture 50 to 75 percent of all plates seen by the reader, and readability is decreased by snow, ice
and grime. According to one DOT, higher rates suggested by LPR technology vendors do not
account for plates that are thrown out due to irregularities.
Another challenge is that license plate numbers are linked to a motor carrier, but not
necessarily to the company that owns the vehicle. Independent truck drivers may lease trucks
with multiple companies per year, working for one carrier, so a USDOT number reader can be
used to provide more detailed information. One DOT noted that LPR may be about 75 percent
accurate alone, but as it is combined with other technologies at weigh stations, this rate increases.
Other technical difficulties were not reported. LPR devices are often introduced as one
feature in a technology package to enable roadside enforcement and/or a virtual weigh station for
commercial vehicles. Several DOTs reported that these systems are installed and maintained by a
hired vendor. The vendor will train staff on using the equipment and provide maintenance.
Privacy Issues
The use of LPR for commercial screening purposes may raise fewer privacy concerns
than uses that target personal vehicles for two reasons: commercial vehicles are highly regulated
and screening is a codified approach to help ensure safety on public roadways. In this use case,
scrutiny is placed on the activities of private motor carriers and commercial trucking companies
– not individual citizens.
One DOT reported that the largest issue they faced was the initial public outcry when
they introduced electronic screening on public roadways. A campaign was used to inform the
public about their activities, and assured the public that personal vehicles and drivers are not
targeted.
No DOT reported subpoena requests for LPR data. FMCSA has considered if there are
PII information risks, but reported that this was not a significant concern because commercial
vehicle license plate information is not linked to an individual. The license plate number is only
linked to the motor carrier.
Awareness and Knowledge of Applicable Laws and Regulations
In one state, DOT staff were keenly aware of ongoing legislative debates related to LPR
regulation. The privacy risks debated tend to focus more on law enforcement uses, but DOT staff
follows the situation to stay abreast of changes that may impact their operations. Another DOT
representative noted that even if an agency has a clear legal right to use LPR for commercial
screening, it is also “good policy to develop good policy.” Agencies should strive for a balance
between public safety needs, and real and perceived privacy issues from the public. It was also
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noted that LPR use is limited by the respective laws in each jurisdiction. Data retention is not
regulated federally, but each state can impose its own retention period. This matters more for
some tasks than others. For example, verifying hours of service using e-screening data may only
take about 8 days. A compliance investigation of a carrier could require 6 months of historical
information.
DOT representatives did not report any significant efforts to specifically address privacy
issues. All had considered the issue, but generally reported that this was not a major problem and
commercial screening was described as a routine task. In one state, training is provided to teach
the staff manning an enforcement station on how to coordinate the system generally, but this
training does not focus on data privacy issues. Typically, the screening process is set up by the
vendor, and the data is collected automatically and reviewed by staff to facilitate any manual
screening or enforcement activities.
Internal Policies
The DOTs interviewed reported no written or formal guidance on privacy controls but
each reported on specific guidelines to control data access and storage. Two DOTs reported that
they only collect data on vehicles that meet a certain weight classification (Class 4 or above).
One DOT also noted that commercial driver information is stored in a distinct database, and the
existing databases for motor carriers and commercial drivers are not linked.
In one state, LPR data is only collected for Class 4 vehicles and higher. Images of Class
1-3 are taken, but once the filtering is applied, the images are immediately deleted. Class 4
vehicle images are captured and reserved for 120 days. At that time, the “overview” image is
deleted; this is the actual photo of the vehicle, which could hypothetically be used to identify
vehicle color, year, model, make, and possibly the driver. Although the DOT interviewee
reported that it does not do this, it was noted that some jurisdictions may use this image for other
purposes, like seatbelt enforcement. After 120 days, this DOT saves the license plate image
itself, the system interpretation of the license plate number, and the related sensor information.
This is saved for 3 years in the core system, and then remains stored in archives.
Summary of Commercial Vehicle Screening Use Case
LPR are one of several technologies used in many states to more efficiently and
automatically screen for regulatory compliance and to enforce safety and other commercial
vehicle transportation regulations. While DOTs reported that LPR devices are not entirely
accurate or reliable, they are commonly being used to automate screening and enforcement
activities. It was also noted that LPR readers are more effective and more useful when applied
with other technologies – such as DOT readers and WIM scales.
Several procedural guidelines are used to control the privacy risks of LPR data use.
Commercial vehicle screening in two states only records images of Class 4 or larger vehicles,
which excludes all passenger vehicles. One state has a main lane LPR device that takes photos of
all vehicles, but personal vehicles (class 1-3) are deleted immediately and discarded
permanently. Data retention policies are also commonly instituted to control LPR data. Finally,
two DOTs reported that they limit access to the data to a small department or group and use user
identification and password controls.
A 2009 FHWA study on the operation of roadside enforcement technologies, including
LPR, reported concerns from motor carriers related to data retention, usage, and privacy. FHWA
noted three suggestions from motor carriers (Krupa and Capecci 2009):
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Institute 30 to 90 day maximum retention periods for data collected.
Collect data only for “specific safety goals or other tangible goals.”
Protect important operational data, customer data and unique identifiers of carriers.

LPR use for commercial vehicle regulatory screening, compliance and enforcement
occurs in a highly-regulated environment, and privacy risks are traditionally not a major concern.
The regulation and monitoring of truck activity is a widely accepted public safety activity that
occurs with or without the use of LPR. LPR and other technologies are primarily introduced in
commercial vehicle purposes to lessen the burden of manual screening and enforcement – which
can lead to savings for both the enforcing agencies and the commercial vehicle operators. Motor
carriers are more willing to accommodate this automation because they recognize the efficiency
gains they receive can translate into time and monetary savings.
TOLLING AND PAYMENT
Many state and local transportation agencies use LPR systems as a tool for tolling, often
either for payment collection or enforcement purposes. Two state DOTs and three local toll
operators provided information on experiences, benefits and challenges with the tool.
History and Current Context
The application of LPR to tolling began in the late 1990s in the context of open road
tolling or electronic toll collection. The major advantage was that toll road users were able to
drive through the toll plaza at highway speeds without having to slow down to pay the toll. This
technology automates toll collection and enforcement by taking a picture of a license plate,
translating the image into computer-readable alphanumeric characters, and checking this
information against databases for account or address information (in the case of pay-by-mail or
enforcement). LPRs are more efficient and less costly than using humans as the primary
collection or enforcement mechanism; this, coupled with their ease-of-use made them an
attractive tool.
The state DOTs and tolling agencies interviewed used LPR for toll collection on an
ongoing basis, although the operational details varied. Both DOTs said LPR systems are
primarily used for tolling, although they have used LPRs to accomplish other data collection
purposes, including as a supplementary data source for travel time estimation, travel behavior
analysis, and identifying candidates for surveys. One DOT also mentioned they use LPR to
comply with Homeland Security requirements, by checking license plates of vehicles on ferries
against national databases.
Local toll agencies used LPR for both toll collection and enforcement, and these systems
were sometimes segregated for each of the two purposes. Once the plate is translated to readable
characters, the toll system checks its user database to match the license plate characters with an
existing account; if none is found, the toll authority checks the plate against vehicle registration
databases to identify the correct mailing address to send the bill.
The enforcement process is similar, although the exact practices vary slightly among
agencies. One local agency conducts periods of special enforcement, for example, where they
used LPR to identify frequent violators and would inform local law enforcement partners to their
violation and location on the facility. One of the DOTs stated they did not use it for enforcement,
but the local law enforcement agencies did use the systems for this purpose.
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Information about LPR System
In discussing hardware, the agencies frequently expressed how easy the systems were to
purchase, install, and operate. They mentioned LPRs are a well-developed technology with many
of the bugs worked out, and the vendors are professional and offer “great products.”
All of the interviewees stated their organization owned the LPR equipment, with the
exception of one DOT, who stated that they own the systems on two specific routes, own but do
not operate the equipment on two other facilities, and eight other roads were privately held and
operated. There was variation among the specific arrangements, with some being concessionary
leases and others operating as public private partnerships. The DOT stated that they owned
“quite a bit” of LPR equipment across their state. One local toll agency reported that they owned
and operated the LPR systems on their entire network, with the exception of one geographicallydistant road, which they outsourced to another agency.
Most toll systems, whether publicly or privately operated, work in the same way. All
LPR components are in communication with and controlled by a computer called the “lane
controller.” Its database, through which a list a toll tags is maintained, is used to validate LPR
reads and charge the customer’s account. The information from each lane controller is passed on
to a plaza host computer. Each plaza host computer is in constant communication with the
central computer in a “back office” center that manages the accounts, enrolls customers and
issues tags, processes the violations, handles all inquiries, and serves as the facility management
center. Most toll road operators contract the back-office activities managed to third party
vendors. The protection of PII by such vendors is typically covered by state statutes pertaining to
data privacy. Because states vary in their requirements, as noted earlier in this report, the
measures taken also vary by state. For example, Washington has very strict statutes designed to
maintain user privacy, and vendors are required to adhere to the same data privacy standards as
are imposed on banking institutions. In other states, there are no specific privacy laws. In these
cases, customer privacy protections are typically explicitly written into the business agreements,
along with any limited permitted uses of that data. Business rules vary greatly with regard to data
retention and access practices, as noted below.
Data Storage and Retention
Data storage practices varied across agencies and use cases. The most consistent practice
involved tolling, where agencies tended to keep data for long periods of time. One agency said
they maintained data “as long as necessary” to complete the toll transaction, but the data would
be destroyed once a charge was enforced. The maximum length of time this particular agency
could keep the data was 30 days, although this period was limited to seven days for reads
associated with a preexisting account. Several agencies deferred to state laws and maintained the
information accordingly: one toll authority kept the data for as long as 4.5 years (but discards
once the toll was paid), and another held the data for 7 years.
LPR used for enforcement had different practices, which again varied by agency. One
DOT used LPR in real time, and data storage was limited to very short term due to storage
capacity limitations. A local toll provider also stated that their law enforcement system does not
store toll data beyond the initial read; the data was deleted after it was read.
Another state DOT using LPR for tolling and travel time analysis said they discard data
immediately after it is collected for any travel time analysis, but store the toll read information
for one year, and even could reuse the data. The agency stated that they might need to reference
the data again in the future for billing disputes.
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Data Security and Access
Several of the toll agencies pointed to state laws or industry standards guiding how they
store and secure data. One DOT, for example, stores data according to state law, which requires
data not be:






Open to the public,
Sold or used for sales, marketing, or solicitation purposes,
Disclosed to any other entity except as may be necessary for the identification of
violators or to a vehicle owner or operator as part of a challenge to the imposition of a
civil penalty, or
Used in a court in a pending action or proceeding.

The state DOT also mentioned that its system is access controlled to the relevant
employees only, and they review and audit access records to ensure inappropriate individuals are
not accessing data. Similarly, a local toll authority said they follow state statute requiring them to
store the data for 4.5 years. It keeps toll information on separate, access-controlled networks
where only the individuals responsible for operating and managing the system are granted
access. Another local toll provider also mentioned that its system saves the information inside a
CSV file, which includes the initial plate read image, the OCR transcription, and other details
associated with the occurrence. All data is controlled and limited to relevant persons, per the
Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standards (PCI 2016). The third local toll provider
mentioned its automated system determines when a toll has been paid and deletes the appropriate
file from its database. The database is also access controlled to the appropriate staff. A DOT
stated that its system is sufficiently automated so employees do not have access to the original
files, and never directly interact with the data.
Data Sharing
Four of the five agencies interviewed reported that they did not share tolling data outside
of their organization. If the agencies receive a subpoena or other court order, they are legally
bound to comply and provide the information, but many emphasized that short of this, they
would not share data. The agencies with partnerships with local law enforcement agencies
mentioned that there was no cross-sharing of data with the agencies.
The one agency that did report data sharing, did so under a contractual arrangement. The
original agency operated toll roads and bridges for other local transportation agencies, and would
share data about transactions on these facilities with the road or bridge owners. The original
agency was the larger operator in the area, and operated a regional data center processing and
handling customer accounts. This agency also emphasized that they only provided data to law
enforcement under court order, per state law.
Technical Issues
The interviewees all extolled the ease of use, high level of automation, and simplicity of
the tolling LPR systems. Some interviewees mentioned that despite the systems being easy to
use, there were still occasional errors that required a human to review and confirm or correct the
computer’s interpretation of the license plate. One local agency stated that systems integration
had been one of the largest challenges: older equipment, for example, took low quality images,
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but the newer system required higher quality. Higher quality images requires upgraded networks
cables and other related infrastructure. The organization was considering upgrading to wireless
as a means of addressing the bandwidth constraints.
Privacy Issues
Both the state DOTs and local toll providers mentioned few privacy problems relating to
LPR and tolling. Some agencies reported that individuals had requested information about
themselves or others, which the agencies’ were not legally permitted to supply. The agencies
reporting this explained that laws in their states restrict their ability to provide information to the
public, with one agency explaining that they could not provide information without a judge’s
order.
From a toll collection standpoint, we have statutes that make the data confidential
information… This is not an internal policy… there is a statute relating to
distributing information that governs this. Everyone knows, you don’t give it
[information] out. If you came in and asked for a plate, we would deny you. We
have to comply with state law.
The agencies reported that they were unaware of any occasions where data were used for
data mining activities, with the exception of using the data internally to improve processes. For
example, one state DOT and one toll agency said they used the data for quality control in
analyzing and optimizing the LPR read accuracy. Another agency reported that the process was
so highly automated that the automation, in combination with state statutes making the data
confidential, had helped reduce any privacy issues.
Awareness and Knowledge of Applicable Laws and Regulations
The agencies frequently reported that state law or industry standards were often the
guidelines they followed relating to protecting privacy. As referenced above, PCI standards and
data storage or access laws influenced how toll providers and state DOTs handled their data.
When discussing potential privacy-threatening situations, like requests for information or data,
both state DOTs and local toll operators would cite state statutes that made the data confidential
and not subject to open records request.
Due to the highly-automated nature of LPR systems and the state statutes restricting
divulging information, the agencies did not report manpower or other resource constraints
restricting their ability to properly address privacy.
Internal Policies
Agencies were asked about both specific training and internal procedures or guidelines
for storing and handling LPR data. When asked if they had specific training policies on data
privacy, two local tolling agencies said no, but they follow state laws; both DOTs reported that
they were unsure; and the final local agency reported they did, but were ultimately unable to
locate a copy of the policy.
When asked about specific policies governing how long data could be stored, two
agencies referenced state laws governing how long data must be stored. One of the local toll
agencies referenced PCI standards requiring data be held for seven years, one DOT reported that
they store tolling data for 30 days at the roadside level, the image of the transaction for one year
at the back office, and the other related transactional details for five years. A local agency
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reported that they are using a current system that stores three images for an undisclosed time
period, but the new system stores data according to the status of the transaction: if an invoice is
closed out, the system deletes the information automatically, but it will store the transactional
information until the transaction is settled.
Summary of Tolling and Enforcement Use Case
State and local transportation agencies commonly use LPR systems for toll collection and
enforcement because it reduces man-hours and saves agencies money. Open road tolling is
current state-of-the-practice. They reported few technical issues with the equipment,
characterizing it as well-developed technology. The agencies reported they often follow state
laws when determining how long to preserve data, although the length of time data could be
maintained varied widely based on state law. Other agencies mentioned their adherence to PCI
standards as helping ensure data privacy and security protections. Agencies often referenced an
organizational culture and ubiquitous knowledge of the issues pertaining to data privacy
protections.
TRAVEL BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS
Travel behavior is the study of how people or goods move from point A to point B.
Travel behavior studies collect data on where, why, how, and when travel is done. Travel
behavior studies are an important tool for state, regional, and local transportation planning and
policy making because data collected are used as inputs to travel demand forecasts. Interviews
with two state DOTs, two MPOs, and three consultants provided information on travel behavior
analytic uses of LPR, benefits and challenges associated with LPR use, and procedures and
policies implemented that impact the privacy risk associated with the use of LPR data.
History and Current Context
Historically, the collection of travel behavior data from various populations of interest
(e.g., households, employees and customers of commercial establishments, commercial vehicle
operators, and visitors) was labor intensive. Teams of field researchers stopped drivers along
roadsides, boarded buses and trains, or visited people in their homes or commercial
establishments to ask questions about origins, destinations, purposes, modes, and times of travel.
Technology improvements led to more cost- and time-effective data collection by automating
certain tasks that were once conducted manually. As noted in the report introduction, beginning
in the mid-1990s, LPR began to be used for travel behavior surveys that involved identifying a
subset of vehicles using a particular transportation facility to gather information on occupants’
origins and destinations as well as other information about the trip for which the facility is being
used. Since that time, LPR has been commonly used to conduct external station surveys
(although it has been applied in one-off studies of vehicles using a particular facility or parked at
specific location of interest). External station surveys involve identifying a subset of vehicles
using a particular transportation facility to gather information on occupants’ origins and
destinations as well as other information about the trip for which the facility is being used. LPR
technology was typically applied to replace roadside intercept survey methods. Such intercept
interviews with sampled vehicle drivers were conducted at interchanges on or near freeway exit
ramps and on the shoulders of the freeway main lanes (Hard et al., 2006). Commercial vehicle
drivers could also be intercepted and interviewed at rest areas, weigh stations, and truck stops.
While quite common in the 1970s–1990s, safety and congestion concerns prompted states to
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discontinue roadside interview surveys and to employ alternative methods such as LPR, which
could identify vehicles and through a license plate match, identified registered owners who could
be sent a questionnaire through the mail.
External station surveys are a significant component of the suite of travel behavior
surveys (i.e., household travel survey, commercial vehicle survey, workplace survey, transitonboard survey) used for travel demand forecasting. External related travel can have a significant
impact on modeled vehicle miles traveled (VMT). External station surveys are used to determine
the number of vehicle trips that originate outside the urban area and continue through the urban
area without stopping (external-external trips), as well as trips that originate inside the urban area
but depart the urban area and trips that begin outside the urban area but travel to a destination
inside the urban area (external-internal trips). There are generally two types of LPR-based
techniques that are used: license plate match and a license plate match with a mail-out/mail-back
survey.
The license plate match involves capture of the license plates of vehicles with time stamp
at two or more survey locations and then matching them to identify vehicle movements between
the different locations (e.g., external-external, external-internal). The match method does not
involve the capture of any PII (e.g., name and address of registered owner, specific origin and
destination information, trip purpose). Only anonymous information is needed to perform the
license matching: license plate number, state of registration, time of day when plate was
recorded, and direction of travel; however for the matching to be most effective all of the survey
locations should be recorded on the same day. This means placing the LPR cameras at a
significant number of locations, which can be extremely costly. As one of the consultants
mentioned, LPR video cameras were deployed at less than half of desired locations in an external
station survey for the Omaha/Council Bluffs metropolitan area due to cost implications. The
sample of captured video license data was used to estimate resident/non-resident apportionment
at the non-video sites.8 Another consultant said that even though equipment costs have come
down with technology advancements, the high cost of data collection does dissuade some public
agencies from employing this method. Even so, his firm conducts about 6–12 license plate
matching surveys per year.
The license plate match with mail-out/mail-back method was a common application for
LPR use in external surveys. Hard and his colleagues found the method used in 17 of 29 origindestination type travel surveys implemented in the late 1990s to early 2000s (Hard et al., 2006).
The survey method is executed in two parts. The first part is the same as the match method
above. The second part includes querying the captured license plates against state motor vehicle
records to obtain the address of vehicle registrants. In most cases, the license data was
transmitted to the state DMV and then returned by the DMV with the needed address
information attached. Then the vehicle owner would be mailed a survey questionnaire to be
returned by mail.
The questionnaire typically contained items on trip origin, destination, vehicle
occupancy, trip purpose, and other trip details. The survey also typically contained introductory
language such as: Your vehicle [with license plate number] was observed traveling on [specific
8

It should be noted that the original survey design for Omaha/Council Bluffs was a license plate match with mail-out/mail-back
survey, but the state division of motor vehicles stated that matching to their state motor vehicle records to identify the vehicle
owner would not be permitted. The DMV did agree to match to obtain the zip code of the owner and this was used to determine
resident/non-resident status.
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roadway] on a [specific date] at a [specific time]. If this was your vehicle, the “x” agency would
like to ask you some important questions about your trip. The language, although required to
verify that the correct vehicle owner was responding to the survey, sometimes raised concerns
about government surveillance or tracing among members of the traveling public. While
imposing greater privacy risks, this method collects more detailed information as data inputs for
VMT forecasting.
In the past 10 years, both consultants and transportation agencies confirmed that the use
of video mail-out/mail-back surveys has declined due many reasons including privacy, data
collection cost, and cost/benefit due to low survey response rates. Privacy concerns have been
expressed by the general public and politicians on the use of public records to obtain the identity
of a vehicle owner traveling on a particular roadway. For instance, TxDOT drastically curtailed
its use of video capture methods as parts of its statewide survey program in the 2005–2006
timeframe. License plate matching can be used as long as no state motor vehicle databases are
queried and persons contacted. In 2016, because of privacy concerns, lawyers for Arizona DOT
ruled out use of LPR as one of several technologies to be evaluated for collecting long-distance
travel data. Cost concerns pertain to not only equipment costs but also labor costs: cameras
typically have to be manned.
The low survey response rates were caused by three factors. First, some license plates are
not read or recorded properly, and cannot be matched. Second, out-of-state plates require special
consideration, because it is often uneconomical to send small groups of license plate data to
several outside states. Third, many people do not respond to the mailing, because they may not
wish to participate, or they may not have been driving the vehicle when the license plate was
recorded.
The practice of how to conduct external surveys is also in a state of transition. Many
external studies across the country have begun using newer technologies such as cellular data
mining, Bluetooth, and GPS (primarily for freight) (Farnsworth and Hard, 2013). An MPO
source mentioned that crowdsourcing of travel survey data on roadway links has not yet raised
alarms of protecting privacy, as individual IDs are typically not included and the origins and
destinations are not. Currently, his MPO does not use LPR for any data collection to determine
travel patterns.
Information on LPR System
The use of LPR for travel behavior surveys was typically implemented by consultants
(i.e., traffic data collection firms or professional transportation planning/engineering firms) who
supplied both the equipment and the labor for data collection as well as the personnel for data
processing and analysis. We could not find any information on agencies who owned LPR
equipment for this purpose.
Data Storage and Retention
There are potentially two types of databases involved in these surveys. First, there is the
database of captured license plates that also contains a survey location code, state of registration,
day and time stamp, and direction of travel. If this is a license plate matching-only survey, this is
the only database required. After license plates have been matched and proportions of externalexternal or internal-external trips have been computed, the common practice is to destroy or
delete all license plate records – even though there is no PII associated. According to consultants,
the typical practice is to keep the data for about 6 months to a year.
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If this is license plate match with mail-out/mail back questionnaire, then the database of
captured license plates is sent to the appropriate DMV for the purpose of obtaining the name of
the individual (or corporation) the vehicle was registered to, street address, city, state, and zip
code. The returned information is used to mail the registered owner a questionnaire. Once the
questionnaires have been mailed, the license plate records are typically destroyed or deleted. An
anonymous sample identification number is used to manage the mail-out and to track the mailback
The second type of database is the database of survey data elements. This database is
typically provided to the transportation agency sponsor. Data are anonymized with the sample
identification number used as the data management controller. Consultants typically would retain
the data for about 6 months to a year following the completion of the study; although some
sponsor contracts might specify longer. Length of data retention is dependent upon the sponsors’
policies, which vary from agency to agency. However, since travel surveys are expensive to
conduct, they are typically executed about once every 7 to 10 year. This can place a burden on
the agency having to retain the data for many years.
Data Storage and Access
Data are typically housed and secured on the server of the survey consultant until the data
are delivered to the survey sponsor as a final deliverable. In the past there have been concerns
about data security, such as whether data is weakly encrypted without following accepted
standards or even encrypted at all. Fortunately, data management and control policies at
transportation agencies have improved in the recent decades as data security and cybersecurity
concerns become critical issues. A potential solution for data security is to house travel survey
datasets at The National Renewable Energy Laboratory, which operates the Transportation
Secure Data Center. This repository provides free access to detailed transportation data from a
variety of travel surveys and studies while preserving the privacy of survey participants. Some
sponsors have chosen to store their datasets long-term at the repository.
Data Sharing
To the knowledge of persons contacted for this case study, data are not shared with
agencies outside of the sponsors. Law enforcement agencies may be contacted to inform them of
LPR data collection in their jurisdictions but not to share any of the information. Our sources
also said that law enforcement agencies have not requested access to travel survey data. One
person postulated that it was because law enforcement is interested in real-time data, not data
that takes time to be processed, cleaned, and reduced.
Technical Issues
Depending on the conditions, the LPR systems could correctly detect approximately 70–
90 percent license plate matches. Weather conditions could be a significant factor in both
accuracy and detection rates. Plate type is also a contributing factor. For example, Tennessee has
over 140 different styles of vanity plates, and there are not unique numbers assigned to each type
of plate. In some travel behavior applications, surveyors would manually use voice recorders
along with LPR to both verbally record and photograph license plates at the same time. But
problems with diction and with accurately seeing the license plate limited the voice recording
strategy. Also problematic images have to be manually inspected to improve accuracy. For these
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technical reasons as well as cost and privacy, LPR use for travel behavior analysis has been
somewhat supplanted by other technologies.
Privacy Issues
Privacy risks are present when captured license plates are queried against motor vehicle
records to obtain ownership and address information. The public becomes aware when a person
receives a survey questionnaire in the mail. A small, but vocal, proportion express alarm to the
survey sponsor or to elected offices about the way in which their license plate numbers were
captured without their knowledge or consent. Public education or awareness campaigns prior to
the survey execution tend to mitigate the concerns.
Privacy risks are lowered if the query is done by the state’s motor vehicle registration
office and the vehicle owners are not contacted. This was the approach used in the
Omaha/Council Bluffs survey, in which the plates were queried only to identify zip codes
(residency) of travelers along several major freeway corridors coming into and out of the area.
Awareness and Knowledge of Applicable Laws and Regulations
Most consultants were aware of applicable laws and regulations governing use of the
data. Transportation agency staff was less aware of laws and regulations but were strongly aware
of their agency’s policy permitting use of LPR for license plate matching or for matching against
state motor vehicle records. Agencies’ concerns were based primarily on perceived public
perceptions. Agencies expected the consultants to properly use and address privacy issues in data
collection and database preparation.
Internal Policies
Most consultants who conduct travel survey data collection have policies on protection of
respondent’s personal information, destruction of records, and release of information. Many state
and local transportation agencies are beginning to put such policies in place.
Summary of Travel Behavior Analysis Use Case
Travel behavior is a vital tool for state and local transportation planning and policy
making. Studying how goods and people move from A to B provides the information required to
make informed planning and policy decisions about how to allocate scarce transportation
resources. LPR use for travel behavior analysis has been somewhat supplanted by other
technologies – like Bluetooth and GPS – for technical, economic and privacy reasons. Securing
data for the long time periods needed for travel behavior purposes can present challenges,
although some entities have outsourced secure data storage to third parties. The interviews
indicated inconsistent knowledge of laws and regulations, although organizations were familiar
with internal data privacy protection policies.
CONCLUSIONS FROM CASE STUDIES
The issues involved in the application of LPR to the transportation uses, depend to a large
degree on whether or not the application pertains to the routine collection of data. For instance,
tolling, access control, and commercial vehicle screening are routine and ongoing uses of the
LPR systems. Case study informants mentioned that the LPR equipment is typically their own,
and that they are well-versed in its operation. These agencies have well-defined data storage,
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retention, security, and access practices. Even though the practices vary by agency, state law
often prescribes the specific practices. While well-aware of the privacy risks, the agencies
mentioned few privacy problems. There is no indication that LPR would be supplanted by other
technologies in the near-term for these transportation uses.
Other cases such as travel time estimation or use for travel behavior analysis have more
isolated instances of privacy concerns. The LPR equipment is typically owned by consultants or
vendors who would be under-contract to the transportation agency. While the consultants
typically have well-defined policies for data privacy protection, the public agencies are less
knowledgeable. In the case of travel time estimation, LPR has been largely supplanted by newer
technologies that are less expensive and easier to apply, such a Bluetooth, cellular, and GPS. In
the area of travel behavior studies, LPR has continued to be used for license plate matching
studies, while its use for license plate matching with mail-out/mail-back is almost non-existent.
The latter use entails contact with a respondent and informing him/her of the license plate
capture and the match to personal information. This situation raises concerns about government
tracking of personal mobility. With such public concerns, survey sponsors have tended to back
off of the use. Newer technologies such as cellular data mining, Bluetooth, and GPS are being
used more frequently.
In all cases, cost- and time-savings are the primary influences on the application of the
technology. Accuracy could be negatively affected by weather, lighting, and other conditions;
although accuracy of the reads has improved over the past two decades. Also in all cases, data
sharing is not a common practice. Sharing with law enforcement is only done when the agency
was under a legal requirement to do so.
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CHAPTER 5: BEST PRACTICES IN PRIVACY PROTECTION
In the U.S., there is no single comprehensive national law that regulates the collection
and use of personal information. Privacy protection is set by a patchwork of federal and state
laws. As for LPR, while no state bans LPR use outright, several states heavily restrict its use. To
guide transportation agencies in balancing between beneficial uses of LPR data and the
protection of individual privacy, the research team has identified best practices when using these
devices in a transportation context. These best practices should be understood as the minimum
aspirations for an agency’s policies, procedures, and controls. Due to the unique requirements of
individual agencies and their differing geographies, uses, and experiences, no one set of best
practices will be applicable to all organizations.
The review covered best practices and recommendations for protecting privacy put forth
from the federal government, interest groups, and international organizations, including:
 The White House, “Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A Framework for
Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Digital Global Economy” (White
House 2012);
 NIST, “Guide to Protecting the Confidentiality of Personally Identifiable Information”
(NIST 2010);
 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “The OECD
Privacy Framework” (OECD 2013).
 The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) “Privacy Impact Assessment
Report for the Utilization of License Plate Readers” (IACP 2009).
LPR systems are commonly used by law enforcement agencies, and as such, much of the
literature surrounding their use focuses on law enforcement purposes. As a result of the dearth of
transportation-focused literature to review, the research team turned to law enforcement
recommendations, documents, and best practices, applying these from the broader perspective of
data privacy as noted in the above bullets.
The team reviewed these best practices and recommendations to identify those that would
applicable to privacy risks associated with LPR use. The list presented in Table 8 represents the
research team’s synthesis of best practices. The team also analyzed the interviews to identify and
reinforce best practices. The case studies provide a source of anecdotes to illustrate how agencies
operationalize these best principles and practices specific to LPR.
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Table 8. Privacy Protection Principles for LPRs
Principle
Transparency &
Openness
Purpose
Specification
Data
Minimization,
Retention, & Use
Limitation
Data Quality &
Accuracy
Accountability
Security

Description
Individuals should be able to acquire information about the collection,
storage, or use of personal information.
Agencies should clearly and specifically state why they are collecting
information. Any changes to the purpose should be clearly stated.
Agencies should only collect the information that is both directly
relevant and necessary to meet their objectives. Agencies should only
retain information as long as is necessary to meet their objectives.
Agencies should strive to ensure data is accurate and high quality.
Incorrect information can negatively harm individuals. Regular audits
can help ensure the data are accurate.
Agencies are responsible for complying with data privacy rules.
Agencies must protect personal data with reasonable security measures
to prevent loss, unauthorized access, or disclosure.

The following subsections describe these principles in detail, and provide illustrative
anecdotes drawn from the interviews about their application for LPR. Each section also includes
a brief checklist agencies can use to determine if each principle could apply to their LPR data
collection activities. When reviewing, if one or more of the questions apply to an agency, the
principle may apply to their operation. It is important to note that these items are best practices,
and are meant as a guiding framework. The use cases for LPR data collection are broad and
diverse, and some aspects of the principles may apply to certain uses, but not others. Agencies
also can use the checklist to help inform their procedures with regards to each principle.
TRANSPARENCY AND OPENNESS
Transparency and openness are key principles. Agencies should notify individuals in their
jurisdictions about the types of information they collect, including passive data collected using
technologies such as LPR. Agencies should also explain how they collect the information, how it
is used, disseminated, shared and protected. This principle encourages agencies to use plain
language to explain their data practices, which helps individuals understand how their
information is being used, and the risks these uses may create.
This principle is particularly significant if the information in question is personally
identifiable. PII includes any information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual‘s
identity, such as name, social security number, date and place of birth, mother‘s maiden name, or
biometric records. A single piece of data can be PII, provided it can be used to distinguish or
trace an individual’s identity, such as a social security number. Likewise, merging multiple
pieces of individually-innocuous data can become PII, even when the individual pieces are not
(e.g, combining date of birth plus a personal address).
LPR data in isolation may not meet this standard, but when aggregated across multiple
sources or matched with information from other databases, LPR can meet the standard of
personally identifiable. Explaining how data is collected and used can help individuals
understand why their information is needed, and this transparency and openness can help
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legitimize these uses in the public’s mind. It may serve to mitigate public perceptions of
government surveillance or tracking of personal mobility.
There is no one-size-fits-all approach to providing notices of data collection activities. An
important aspect of this principle is that the communication should be clear and understandable,
and devoid of legal jargon. Agencies often use their public-facing website to explain the
rationale and process of data collection. Publically displaying a project website on a variable
messaging sign, sending notices to an affected community, or using an existing online customer
account portal are all potential options for informing the public. For example, tolling agencies
often use their customer account portals or user agreements to communicate about data
collection and use.
In addition, notices need not be provided in every instance of collection where privacy
has been addressed by prior or preexisting notices; however, notices need specifically deal with
the issue of obtaining consent and explicitly state how the agency will consider that consent was
obtained. For example, the following are four common methods used to obtain consent. The
method for obtaining consent should be customized to fit the needs of the data collection context,
while considering the severity of the privacy risks, as well as the data collection location and the
agency’s access to the individuals.
 Explicit consent —an individual is clearly presented with an option to agree or
disagree with the collection, use, or disclosure of personal information.
 Implicit consent — an individual’s consent is implied by his/ her behavior relative to
the data collection activity.
 Opt-out consent —an individual is given the option to decline consent
 Opt-in consent – an individual is provided a check-box which, if filled in by the user,
indicates consent.
The method for obtaining consent should be customized to fit the needs of the data
collection context, while considering the severity of the privacy risks, as well as the data
collection location and the agency’s access to the individuals.
In a passive data collection situation as is often the case with LPR, individuals may not
be aware that their behavior is being observed and recorded, and obtaining permission typically
is not possible. In this situation, the agency should take all steps necessary to protect the privacy
and security of that information as required by state law and professional practice. If PII cannot
be de-identified, the agency should delete the personal data or seek informed consent from the
individual for any further use.

72

Principle Checklist:
1. Is your agency collecting information on individuals with its use of LPR?
2. Is the information considered PII: does it contain information that identifies an individual, or
is the information linked with other information that can identify an individual?
3. Does your agency communicate to individuals in your jurisdiction about all data collection
activities involving LPR systems?
4. Does your agency consider the manner in which consent has been obtained: opt-out, opt-in,
implied, informed, or explicit? Do public notices communicate the method?
Answering these questions can help your agency understand if the principle of transparency
applies to your data collection activity, and identify possible actions or tools to aid
implementation. If answers to these any of these questions are “yes”, then the principle of
transparency and openness could apply to the data collection activity.
PURPOSE SPECIFICATION
This principle builds upon the transparency principle. Agencies should clearly and
specifically state why they are collecting information, and under what authority they are
gathering the information, when providing notices of LPR-related data collection activities. This
purpose specification should be clearly articulated in writing in advance of starting a specific
LPR data collection activity. Identifying the “purpose” creates a guiding framework for
balancing data needs and privacy, and the documentation can be helpful for those who must
answer the public’s or media’s questions about privacy risk. If the agency adopts new purposes,
or changes the original purpose(s) for collection, these should be documented and clearly
communicated to their constituencies as well. This information should be available to consumers
at the time of data collection and throughout any continued uses.
As an example drawn from the commercial vehicle screening case study, when a camera
was installed on a roadway for commercial vehicle screening, the DOT informed the public that
its purpose was only to gather information on commercial vehicle activity. The DOT launched a
public awareness campaign to inform the public that they were not looking at personal vehicles,
enforcement of speed limits, or even the drivers of commercial vehicles. In the commercial
screening case studies from this research, several DOTs set up a system where they immediately
discarded the data they did not need (e.g., Class 1-3 vehicles since the DOT was looking only at
Class 4 and above). By understanding the purpose of the data use, the DOT has avoided holding
data that could be a privacy risk.
Privacy notices should be reviewed on a regular basis to ensure that the type of data
collected and the intended uses have not changed. The actual data collection practices and
technologies being used should be consistent with the commitments made to individuals in the
jurisdiction and comply with evolving regulatory requirements. The privacy notices should also
state any data sharing that will be done with third parties. This principle can apply to collecting
identifying or non-identifying data, but is perhaps most critical when agencies collect sensitive
and PII data.
During case study interviews, agencies noted that while they would occasionally receive
requests for data, they would not share the information. Their purpose in using the data was very
narrow, and they would not grant other entities access, unless they were legally compelled
through subpoena or other court order. Some organizations inform the public about their data
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collection activities, and the purposes behind such activities through existing customer portals or
public-facing websites.
Principle Checklist:
1. Does your agency have a clear specific purposes for the data it is collecting?
2. Does your agency staff and the affected public understand the purpose or purposes for which
LPR data are collected and maintained?
3. Does your agency typically limit the collection of personal data to only those items that are
necessary to the research purpose, and ensure they are not used in any manner incompatible
with these purposes?
4. Does your agency regularly audit the purposes for which LPR data are used?
Answering these questions can help your agency understand if the principle of purpose
specification applies to your data collection activity, and identify possible actions or tools to aid
implementation. If answers to any of these questions are “yes,” then the principle of purpose
specification could apply to the data collection activity.
DATA MINIMIZATION, RETENTION, AND USE LIMITATION
This principle requires agencies only collect information that is both directly relevant and
necessary to meet their objectives. The agency should retain the information only as long as is
necessary to meet its objectives. In addition, any personally identifiable or sensitive information
should not be disclosed or shared, unless such uses are consistent with the purposes explicitly
specified. Minimizing the amount of PII collected with LPR systems and the length of time it is
stored can also reduce the severity of a data breach or other unintended data action, should one
occur.
Transportation agencies often talk about collecting data once and using it many times;
sometimes for some future unknown purpose. While this is efficient from a data acquisition
perspective, it often means that agencies may collect more data elements than they might need
for a specific purpose and keep it on hand longer than is necessary. This principle reminds
agencies of the potential harm that could arise from collecting superfluous data, or retaining PII
longer than necessary. To do so would be an unfair and deceptive practice. If an agency collects
more than necessary, this could lead others to believe the agency will use it in ways that have not
been communicated, putting privacy at risk.
During interviews, agencies often mentioned their focus on several aspects of this
principle. Agencies, for example, often would point to their efforts to limit the amount of data
they collect, how long they keep it, and only collecting the data they need. In commercial
screening, agencies would only collect data from the heavy goods or commercial vehicles that
were within their purview; other vehicles were automatically dropped from collection.
Another example was when an agency set its LPR system to only collect the last three
digits of a license plate; for its purposes, this was all the information needed. Limiting collection
to only the necessary information enabled the agency to reduce privacy risks.
Finally, some agencies reported that they would not share information with outside entities
unless legally compelled through a subpoena.
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Principle Checklist:
1. Does your agency collect information on individuals: sensitive, PII, or otherwise?
2. Is your agency clear about the specific LPR data to be collected and the databases to which it
might be linked?
3. Could individuals be harmed if the information collected by your agency is not properly
protected from loss?
4. Does your state government mandate how long information can be stored?
5. Does your agency have procedures to separately store or remove identifiers from data records
once they are no longer needed?
6. Does your agency have contracts in place to ensure that subcontractors provide an
appropriate level of protection?
Answering these questions can help your agency understand if the principle of data
minimization, retention, and use limitation applies to your data collection activity, and identify
possible actions or tools to aid implementation. If answers to any of these questions are “yes”,
then the principle of data minimization, retention and use limitation could apply to the data
collection activity.
DATA QUALITY AND ACCURACY
Agencies should work to ensure the data they collect and use are accurate and of high
quality. Explicit quality checks should be performed. In addition, agencies should allow
individuals the opportunity to correct any information about themselves that may be incorrect if
data are used in an ongoing manner, such as for tolling or commercial vehicle screening. This
principle is closely linked with the principles requiring accountability and openness.
Inaccurate data can harm individuals, by – for example – erroneously billing an
individual, which could occur in a tolling context. If a vehicle is sold, and the new vehicle owner
incurs tolls, those charges could be sent to the original owner if a connected database is not
updated to reflect the new owner. In travel behavior surveys with a mail-out/mail-back option,
the erroneous identification of a vehicle being sited on a particular road at a particular time can
result in embarrassing or more-threatening situations. Taking steps to ensure databases with
personal information are up-to-date and high quality can reduce the likelihood of these or similar
incidents. Allowing individuals to verify their personal information, and request it be corrected if
inaccurate, provides a form of redress and can minimize harms from inaccurate data.
Some agencies mentioned that data accuracy can be a concern with LPR systems. Certain
lighting conditions, like those that commonly occur during dawn and dusk periods, can reduce
the accuracy of plate reads. These agencies mentioned that their LPR systems worked on a
probabilistic basis: if the computer did not meet a certain confidence threshold when attempting
to read a plate, a human would manually review what the computer saw and interpreted. This
sort of human intervention was more expensive, but helped to ensure the quality and accuracy of
their data systems. This step reduces the likelihood an individual will be harmed by low-quality
or inaccurate data.
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Principle Checklist:
1. Does your agency collect information on individuals: sensitive, PII, or otherwise?
2. Does your agency routinely collect and use LPR data pertaining to the same individuals?
3. If the data your agency has collected is incorrect or inaccurate, is there potential to harm
individuals?
4. Does your agency have procedures for handling access requests from individuals? Do these
include procedures for responding to requests in a reasonable period of time?
Answering these questions can help your agency understand if the principle of data quality and
accuracy applies to your data collection activity, and identify possible actions or tools to aid
implementation. If answers to any of these questions are “yes,” then the principle of data quality
and accuracy could apply to the data collection activity.
ACCOUNTABILITY
The principle of accountability requires that agencies be responsible for ensuring they
comply with data privacy principles. Written rules and procedures should define internal policies
governing the use and disclosure of personal data, including data collected via LPR systems.
Internal policies should be consistent with local privacy and data protection laws, and should be
reviewed periodically to keep up with evolving regulations. Agencies should also hold their
employees accountable for upholding the privacy principles.
An agency is accountable when there is an entity responsible for checking to see if they
comply with the rules; this is often a third party auditor or can even be a law enforcement
agency. During the interviews, some agencies referenced third parties that would audit their
records to ensure they were in compliance. One agency mentioned that they had to report their
LPR use to a state legislative oversight body, for example. Several agencies were required to
adhere to certain principles, like destroying data after a given time period, under a state law.
Such legal requirements, coupled with regular reporting or auditing, can also create
accountability in the system.
Tolling agencies also, for example, would commonly point to the PCI Security Standards
that create a variety of requirements on an entity collecting payment through credit cards. The
PCI Data Security Standards are a set of requirements instituted and regulated by the PCI
Security Standards Council. The Security Standards Council is a consortium of major card
brands including VISA, MasterCard, American Express, DiscoverCard, and JCB International
Credit Card Company. All organizations that process, store, or transmit payment card data must
comply with PCI security requirements or be fined and/or risk losing their ability to process
credit card payments. According to the PCI SCC website, penalties are not openly discussed nor
widely publicized. These standards provide an additional level of accountability: if an agency
does not comply with these standards, it can lose its ability to process credit card payments.
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Principle Checklist:
1. Does your organization collect information on individuals: sensitive, PII, or otherwise?
2. Does your agency have defined internal policies governing the collection of data and the use
and disclosure of personal information?
3. Are your agency staff aware of those rules and trained in how to implement the procedures?
Answering these questions can help your agency understand if the principle of accountability
applies to your data collection activity, and identify possible actions or tools to aid
implementation. If answers to any of these questions are “yes,” then the principle of
accountability could apply to the data collection activity.
SECURITY
The security principle requires that agencies must protect personal data with reasonable
measures to prevent loss, unauthorized access, or disclosure. Determining which security
measures are reasonable will vary depending on the data collection methods, data types, and
other variables. Agencies should assess their specific situation, and conduct security and privacy
assessments to determine which practices are reasonable and appropriate. The use of appropriate
security safeguards to provide necessary privacy protection includes:
 Physical measures: restricting access to LPR hardware and software systems
 Technological tools: passwords, encryption, firewalls
 Organizational controls: limiting access, staff training, agreements with
subcontractors and consultants.
The security policy should also include a procedure for dealing with a potential data
breach in which personal data are disclosed. Individuals whose data have been disclosed must be
notified if the disclosure exposes them to some risk and steps should be taken to protect against
that risk. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 27001 is a recognized
information security standard upon which a thorough security policy can be based. It
comprises information security standards published jointly by ISO and the International
Electrotechnical Commission and provides best practice recommendations on information
security management, risks and controls within the context of an overall information security
management system (ISMS), similar in design to management systems for quality assurance (the
ISO 9000 series) and environmental protection (the ISO 14000 series). It is applicable to
organizations of all and sizes and encourages them to assess their information security risks, then
implement appropriate information security controls according to their needs, using the guidance
and suggestions where relevant. Given the dynamic nature of information security, the ISMS
concept incorporates continuous feedback and improvement activities, summarized by Deming's
"plan-do-check-act" approach, that seek to address changes in the threats, vulnerabilities or
impacts of information security incidents.
During the interviews, agencies commonly mentioned a variety of security measures to
protect sensitive or personal data. Perhaps the most common method was the use of role and
credential-based security. This practice entails agencies granting access to sensitive data only to
members of the staff that need the access, and restricting this access through computerized
credentials. For example, an individual that needs access to sensitive information would be
granted rights through his or her computer log-in information, while individuals whose jobs did
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not require it would not be granted such access. The application of technological controls, like
encryption, was a much less typical practice.
Principle Checklist:
1. Does your agency collect information that should not be released publically, like PII or
sensitive information?
2. Does your agency have security protocols in place for each data set that protect against loss
or unauthorized access?
3. Will individuals be harmed if information collected by your agency is not properly protected
from loss?
4. If a data breach occurs, does your agency have procedures in place for timely notification of
affected individuals relating to a potential data breach?
Answering these questions can help your agency understand if the principle of security applies to
your data collection activity, and identify possible actions or tools to aid implementation. If
answers to any of these questions are “yes,” then the principle of security could apply to the
data collection activity.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND
SUGGESTED FUTURE RESEARCH
CONCLUSIONS
This study examined privacy risk in transportation uses of LPR, and potential practices
for minimizing that risk. The use of LPR technology for transportation purposes is not new:
applications stem from the 1990s as means of more efficient data collection, improved data
quality, and reduced costs. LPR, like other new technologies, was viewed as a “technological
fix” for the cost and time challenges associated with capturing required information for
transportation planning and policy making. However, even at the time, an opposing perspective
viewed LPR as a “big brother-like” force with negative implications for individual privacy.
Privacy is defined as the capability of individuals to determine for themselves when, how, and to
what extent information about them is communicated to others.
Many of the negative perceptions related to LPR use come from its increasing use among
law enforcement, and concerns about their purposes and who has access to the collected
information. Such concerns have been raised by privacy advocates such as the ACLU, and are
tied to governments’ ability to track and reconstruct individuals’ movements across space and
time without their knowledge or consent. A close look at public opinion trends indicated that
people are growing more concerned (not less) about government surveillance, security breaches,
and individual data privacy. While there could be transference of concerns about law
enforcement use of the technology to the transportation context, this study did not reveal this to
be a significant issue. This research revealed a decreasing application of LPR for some
transportation purposes such as travel behavior, but most often this was because LPR was
supplanted by newer technologies, such as Bluetooth, GPS, or cellular data mining.
Privacy Risk and Transportation Uses
Privacy risk is tied to the likelihood of PII disclosure and the magnitude of harm that
might result. PII is information that – by itself or in combination with other information – can
identify, locate, or distinguish an individual. Examples can include names, addresses, social
security numbers, credit card numbers, and precise geographical locational data. Five
transportation uses of LPR were identified in this study: travel time estimation, access control,
commercial vehicle screening, tolling and payment, and travel behavior analysis. Of these use
cases, two were deemed higher risk: tolling payments and travel behavior analysis. Payment uses
may link vehicle data from LPR to an individual user account that includes financial information.
Financial information contributes to a higher possibility of a problem occurring because of the
opportunity for fraud, identity theft or economic loss. However, case study interviews revealed
that tolling agencies appeared to have defined policies, practices, and industry standards
protecting their customer data.
In contrast, travel behavior analysis involved a high potential for harm because it was the
use most likely to incorporate detailed information about the individual and his/her behaviors.
The harm increases as individual actions are recorded at multiple locations and times, making it
possible for an individual’s actions to be tracked. While the consultants who routinely conduct
the travel behavior studies have widely implemented data protection policies, the transportation
agencies who sponsor them were less knowledgeable of their responsibilities for data protection
and security; although awareness is growing. There has been a discontinuance of LPR studies

79

involving mail-out/mail back surveys. This has been largely due to vocal public concerns that
reached the media or public officials.
Commercial vehicle activity, which may be operationally similar to passenger uses, were
a lower privacy risk because the industry is highly regulated and, although a driver is a private
citizen, the activities of the driver and the vehicle are associated with a commercial operation.
Legal Issues
While privacy risks are a salient concern, legal use of the technology is also a pressing
issue. In the U.S., there is no comprehensive national legislation regarding personal data
protection generally, or use of LPR systems specifically. While most states have enacted some
form of privacy legislation, only 12 states have enacted legislation specifically pertaining to the
use of LPR systems. In none of these states is the use of LPR banned or prohibited. However,
several states heavily restrict its use. Several states have measures in place that restrict who can
use LPRs and for what purposes (e.g., Arkansas and Maine). Most of the state laws cite
restrictions on data use and sharing, and place requirements on data destruction. However,
indicative of the interstate variance, data destruction requirements range from 14 days to 1095
days. Specific transportation uses are rarely, if ever, mentioned in the legislation.
At the judicial level, the Fourth Amendment has long been considered the most relevant
article of the Constitution protecting citizens’ privacy. It has at its core the security of one’s
privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the government. Unfortunately, advances in Fourth
Amendment doctrine have fallen behind rapid progress in modern information technologies, such
as LPR systems that seem to conflict with individuals’ expectations of locational privacy. Recent
U.S. Supreme Court decisions on individuals’ locational privacy have been conflicting or left
key questions unresolved (Gierlack et al., 2014). As this issue is becoming more prominent in the
public discourse, the research team holds that it is difficult to predict exactly how the Court will
resolve Fourth Amendment issues raised by LPRs in the future.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The implementation of the best practices presented in this report will serve to mitigate
privacy risks associated with LPR use. While the practices apply to data privacy protection
collected via any means, LPR systems fall into a special category of modern data collection
technologies that have the potential to identify unique individuals. Thus, LPR application is
likely to receive greater scrutiny in the future – certainly by law enforcement, but likely for other
uses as well. The implementation of the practices can serve as insurance against future privacyrelated challenges. The team consolidated best available guidance (i.e., White House, NIST,
OECD, and IACP) into the following practices:


Transparency and openness: Agencies should notify or otherwise communicate the
types of information they collect and how that information is used, disseminated, and
shared to individuals within their jurisdictions.



Purpose specification: Agencies should clearly communicate why they are collecting
information and under what authority; a change in purpose requires an update of the
communication.
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Data minimization, retention, and use limitation: Agencies should only collect
information that is necessary to meet their specified purpose, retain it for only as long
as needed, and restrict its use to only specified purposes.



Data quality and accuracy: Agencies should ensure that data are accurate, of high
quality, and – when relevant – enable individuals to review and correct any
information.



Accountability: Agencies should define explicit policies and procedures for
complying with data protection principles.



Security: Agencies should protect personal data with reasonable measures to prevent
loss, unauthorized access or disclosure.

Because of uncertainty in the future legal environment, and in how the public perceives
LPR use for transportation purposes, the research team also recommends that agencies monitor
evolving state legislation and judicial cases involving data privacy in general, and LPR use
specifically as well as public opinion trends in their specific jurisdictions.
FURTHER RESEARCH
There is the need for more transportation-focused empirical research on data privacy.
Privacy is a data issue that has grown in importance and complexity over the past decade. The
transportation industry has been fortunate – technologies have been developed to capture and
store more data and in more detail than ever before, at relatively low cost. Advances in data
mining and analytics and the massive increases in computing power and data storage capacity
have expanded, by orders of magnitude, the scope of transportation-related information available
to businesses, government, and individuals. Transportation agencies have more data and different
data. The risks associated with unauthorized collection or misuse of PII have increased.
These issues are not unique, or even new to transportation, having existed more
prominently in social media and e-commerce for a much longer period. However, transportation
professionals lack an evidence base that focuses on the legal, technical, and societal issues
relevant to data privacy and data protection in the transportation context, in which there are both
public and private interests in the data. The following are suggested topics for ongoing research.


Public opinion research is needed that isolates and tracks privacy-related concerns
specific to transportation and how those concerns may be affected people’s
transportation behavior. Tracking would help agencies monitor whether people are
more or less concerned about data privacy and security issues and the context for
those concerns.



The focus of this research -- privacy risks of LPR technology -- is just the proverbial
“tip of the iceberg” in transportation. LPR systems are being supplanted by newer
technologies that are more cost- and time-efficient for many of their transportation
uses. The examination of privacy risks of these newer technologies such as Bluetooth,
GPS, and cellular data mining would inform agencies use of them. Questions include:
o Who should own data of use to transportation agencies and what are sharing
protocols?
o How can transportation agencies ensure an adequate level of data literacy for
handling new data streams and novel types?
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o What are the trade-offs in terms of open data / privacy protections that
transportation agencies will need to make? And, what are their economic
costs?
o How can transportation agencies responsibly capture, use, and share geolocated personal information?


In addition, connected transport (and not just DSRC-connected) is an area that may
bring extensive risks to privacy, and should be the focus future research on data
privacy in transportation. The annual automated vehicle symposium co-sponsored by
the Transportation Research Board and the Association for Unmanned Vehicle
Systems puts forth research needs statements on this topic. Recent statements have
focused on best practices for consumer notices at various levels of automation and
during testing, as well as best methods for handing data produced by automated
vehicle systems.
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APPENDIX: INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE
1. For which of the following purposes has your agency used data collected via LPR
technology? Is your agency still using LPR-collected data for [each] purpose? IF NO:
Why not?
a) Travel time estimation
b) Commercial freight vehicle screening
c) Payments (toll, parking, etc.)
d) Travel behavior analysis
e) Other:
2. When LPR data are collected, are they typically used once and then discarded, or
collected and used many times for different purposes? Why or why not?
3. What are main benefits to your agency of using LPR data?
4. What are the main challenges?
5. Does your agency own LPR equipment? IF NO, why not?
6. Does your agency train staff in using LPR data, in terms of proper handling in light of
data privacy requirements, etc.? If written training materials, can you provide to us.
7. Can you give me an account of the last time LPR was used to collect data for travel time
estimation? [Probes]
a) Time frame (how long ago)
b) Vehicles and motorists targeted
c) Were any other state or local transportation agencies involved?
d) What databases were the license plates matched against?
e) Were LPR-collected data linked with other data?
f) What were the main challenges in using LPR for this purpose?
8. In general, what are your agency’s procedures or guidelines for storing LPR data, e.g.,
length of time, location? If written document, can you provide it to us.
9. After data are stored, are they sometimes used for general data mining?
10. Are they sometimes linked to other databases for use in separate studies?
11. Are there procedures or guidelines that your agency follows in terms of the linking of
your agency’s LPR data with other databases? If written document, can you provide it to
us.
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12. Does all staff have access to stored LPR databases or is access controlled in some way?
13. Does your agency have written procedures or guidelines in terms of who can access LPR
data? Can you provide it to us?
14. Does your agency have access to the LPR databases of other departments or agencies?
15. Under what circumstances has your agency shared data from LPR systems with other
agencies for traffic/law enforcement purposes?
16. Has your agency ever been subpoenaed to provide data for traffic or law enforcement
purposes? What was the outcome?
17. What safeguards, if any, exist to prevent privacy data “bleed” between your agency and
law enforcement agencies?
18. Has your agency run into any specific privacy issues or challenges related to the LPR
data?
19. IF YES: How has the department managed these issues?
20. IF NO: What does your department do to ensure that there will be no privacy issues?
21. Has your agency done any specific activities to raise awareness and knowledge among
staff of applicable laws and regulations governing use of LPR data?
Are there any other thoughts or comments that you would like to share before we wrap up?
That’s the end of my questions. Thanks very much for taking part in this discussion today; it was
very helpful to us.
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